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ABSTRACT 
Emerging needs of the emergency management discipline are outlined in recent 
presidential directives, national strategies and federal emergency management 
strategic initiative documents. Meeting these needs requires collaboration as a 
core capability. Collaboration with diverse communities, volunteers and the 
private sector are essential, as are strategic and operational actions for 
collaboration, building social capital, and using social media for collaboration. 
The future of our nation’s resilience to disasters depends on a collaborative 
network of partners that reaches from the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency to individual citizens and the communities they inhabit.  State emergency 
management agencies are the hub of this network and must lead the effort to 
effectively collaborate at all levels. The research findings of this thesis show that 
state emergency management organizations have not yet fully developed the 
collaborative capacities necessary to meet emerging needs. In addition, data 
shows that organizational structures of state emergency management 
organizations are impacting collaborative capacity development. In particular, 
military-based organizations lag behind their civilian-based counterparts in every 
area of collaborative capacity building. Reasons for these differences, and 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
One crucial characteristic of the successful emergency manager is 
the necessity of collaboration and leadership outside their own 
organization. Emergency management entities rarely own the 
resources and influences needed to mitigate, prevent, protect, 
respond or recover from the threats and hazards they face. 
Emergency managers lead communities of effort, or networks of 
participants. The leadership skills required for emergency 
managers are not the traditional ones expected for more 
hierarchical professions. Emergency managers are leaders, 
facilitators, coordinators, and collaborators all at the same time. 
National Emergency Management Association website accessed 
April 21, 2012 
 
Things can fall apart, or threaten to, for many reasons, and then 
there’s got to be a leap of faith. Ultimately, when you’re at the edge, 
you have to go forward or backward; if you go forward, you have to 
jump together. 
Yo-Yo Ma 
Emergency management, and its half-brother homeland security, is an 
increasingly complex enterprise. Bigger and more frequent climatic and geologic 
disasters have increased the size, scope and partners involved in disaster 
management planning. Reaction to the events of 9/11 has created new 
homeland security missions for federal, state and local governments, and a 
resulting new wave of organizations at every level. Large amounts of federal 
grant funding have been pumped into planning and response networks across 
the public sector, expanding the amount of equipment, training programs and 
exercises, along with program management, legal, financial and administrative 
staff to manage it all. Global corporations transcend political borders and 
possess emergency communications, traveler tracking, worldwide news networks 
and incident response capabilities that often make the public sector envious. 
Volunteer networks, encompassing all manner of faith-based, nonprofit and 
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community-based organizations, have formalized emergency management 
training programs and are now an essential element of disaster response and 
recovery. There is recognition that the number and variety of stakeholders in the 
homeland security enterprise includes partners from all walks of life. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has come to call 
these partners “the Whole Community.”  FEMA defines the Whole Community as 
a concept that organizations and individual communities use to communicate 
their needs, strengths, and capacities in order to collectively build resilience 
through increasing social capital. (FEMA Whole Community Approach, 2011)  
FEMA guidance and recent presidential directives such as the National 
Preparedness Goal recognize that resilience to disasters can be achieved only 
when all partners work together.   
FEMA conducted a study over 2010 and 2011, to look at the emerging 
needs of the emergency management discipline and to define the core 
capabilities to meet those needs. The Strategic Foresight Initiative (SFI) resulted 
in a vision document called Crisis Response and Disaster Resilience 2030: 
Forging Strategic Action in an Age of Uncertainty. This document described the 
complex threats we face in the coming decades and the collaboration skills 
emergency managers must develop to build resilient organizations and 
communities.  
Emergency management agencies cannot do it alone. This is especially 
true at the state emergency management level. States are the hub through which 
all protection and preparedness activities must pass. Yet many state emergency 
management agencies seem to be organized and managed as though they can 
indeed do it alone: a scan of state emergency management agency websites 
across the fifty states reveals precious little in the way of connection to 
volunteers, communities, or any entities outside of local emergency management 
contacts, if indeed those are included in the website at all. An agency’s website 
may not be the best indicator of services offered, but it is the most publicly 
available source of information about an organization, and in most instances the 
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only source of information that can be found. Even social media connections 
such as Facebook and Twitter, which have transcended the private sector and 
become ubiquitous on other government websites, are not often found on state 
emergency management agency sites. 
Some state emergency management agencies do seem to stand out as 
leaders in partnering capabilities. Some have listed extensive volunteer 
resources on websites. Some have developed public awareness readiness 
campaigns that incorporate elements of social media. A few demonstrate 
partnerships with local businesses and powerful private sector organizations 
such as McDonald’s and Walmart. 
What makes one state emergency management agency better at 
partnering than another?  No two state emergency management agencies are 
alike, just as no two state governments are alike. But some broad structural 
patterns emerge. According to the most recent information collected from states 
every two years by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), 
nineteen state emergency management agencies are organized within military 
departments, twelve within public safety departments, nine within governors’ 
offices, nine within homeland security or state law enforcement departments, and 
two that do not fit any of these structural categories. 1  In these structural patterns, 
no geographic, historical or other commonalities are readily apparent; for 
example, the three states that include emergency management agencies within 
their state police departments are Michigan, New Jersey and Texas…three 
states with seemingly nothing in common. No data can be found to explain why 
thirty six percent of states include their emergency management functions within 
                                                 
1 NEMA Biennial Report survey data are available only to NEMA members.  However, state 
and territorial EMAs charted by broad organizational structure category can be viewed on the 
NEMA website at: 
http://www.nemaweb.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=209&Itemid=377.  
Accessed July 17, 2011.  The current NEMA 2012 Biennial Report highlights can be viewed at: 
http://www.nemaweb.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=474&Itemid=442.  
Accessed November 10, 2012. 
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military-based organizations while the remaining states maintain emergency 
management functions within civilian-based organizations. 
Do these various organizational structures of state emergency 
management make a difference in their ability to collaborate?  Can the broad 
organizational patterns be used to study collaborative capacities of each? 
These are relevant questions. Collaborative capacity of state emergency 
management agencies matters. No other public sector level of emergency 
management demands the ability to partner with so many different communities, 
organizations and governments. Federal entities work primarily with states; locals 
work with states…and states work with everyone. States must truly understand 
and embrace the meaning of “whole community” more than any other entity in 
the emergency management system. 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Recent literature in the form of presidential policy directives, FEMA and 
state testimonies before congress, and countless blogs, professional forums and 
industry publications show that the emergency management discipline has many 
new demands. The increasing size and scope of natural disasters has raised the 
cost of response and recovery at the same time economic woes have shrunk 
response and recovery resources. The widespread adoption of handheld 
smartphones and social networking media in all levels of society has changed 
the way citizens respond to emergencies, and in turn, the way emergency 
management agencies must plan for response. There is recognition that disaster 
resilience, as well as the ability to counter the radicalization that often leads to 
terrorism, depends on relationships at the community level and increases the 
demand for collaboration among diverse groups. Added to these new demands, 
The President, Congress and the Department of Homeland Security have 
stepped up efforts, through new doctrine such as the National Preparedness 
Goal (2011), to strengthen national preparedness capabilities in the five core 
mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. 
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Though we have learned a great deal from the disaster events of the past 
two decades, neither the discipline of homeland security nor the discipline of 
emergency management is close to maturation. It is well recognized (e.g., FEMA 
Whole Community Approach (2011); Reale (2011), that we cannot be effective 
as a nation in protecting ourselves if the government agencies charged with 
protection responsibilities do not work with each other, other agencies, the 
private sector and the communities and individuals they serve. Working together 
in coordination and creating networks of relationships are called for, but these 
alone will not suffice. (Kaiser, 2011, 6)  Emergency management agencies will 
need to build and strengthen collaborative capacity to meet current and future 
demands of the discipline. 
Nowhere in government is this need more readily apparent than at the 
state level. States are unique within the emergency management hierarchy in the 
number of organizations and individuals they must interface with, and build 
relationships with, in order to meet their prevention, protection, mitigation, 
response and recovery missions. Each state has its unique issues, budgets and 
political realities that can influence how its public safety and homeland security 
needs are met. This results in a national patchwork of state emergency 
management organizations with no two organizational structures alike. 
Additionally, some states organize their emergency management agencies within 
military departments, a structure not seen in any other level of government. Are 
there significant differences in how military-based versus civilian-based 
structures collaborate with other organizations and communities?  What impact 
might these structures have on the ability of state emergency management 
agencies to build collaborative capacity?  These questions are as yet unstudied. 
Research for this thesis defines emerging needs of the emergency 
management discipline; explores the collaborative capacities needed to meet 
these needs and the impact on state emergency management agencies; and 
presents data to determine whether organizational structures of state emergency 
management agencies have an effect on capacity to build and utilize 
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collaborative skills. The audience for this research includes state governors, 
prospective state governors, leaders in the state emergency management and 
homeland security community, and students of these disciplines. 
1.1.1 Emergent Needs for Emergency Management 
In developed nations, an expectation most citizens have is that their 
governments protect them as much as possible from the effects of disasters.  
They also expect assistance in recovery from disasters and the resumption of the 
normal activities of their lives. In the U.S., this expectation has shifted over the 
past several decades from a focus on nuclear war during the Cold War era to the 
current focus on “all hazards,” including the increase in major impact weather 
events and terrorism. The establishment in 2002 of the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), FEMA’s incorporation into that organization, and the 
millions of federal dollars dedicated by Congress to homeland security and 
emergency preparedness and response, is evidence that disaster response and 
recovery has stepped to the forefront of Americans’ expectation of government 
responsibilities. 
Recent presidential directives have reinforced this expectation. In March 
2011, Presidential Policy Directive Eight (PPD-8) set forth the need for a national 
preparedness goal, and a system that will allow the Nation to “prevent, protect 
against, mitigate the effects of, respond to and recover from those threats that 
pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation.”  This Directive and the 
national preparedness framework it engenders emphasize a national approach to 
preparedness, replacing the more disparate objectives of prior national homeland 
security strategies. However, as evidenced by statements the DHS Strategic 
Plan 2012-2016 (p16), increased attention to preparedness at the national level 
demonstrates the recognition that these systems must work closely together, and 
resources must be shared collaboratively across the country if we are to become 
resilient as a whole. As the DHS document notes, the robust response needed 
for national resilience to disasters requires the engagement and integration of the 
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private sector, government and nongovernmental organizations, other community 
organizations and individual citizens. (DHS Strategic Plan 2012-2016, 16) 
Parallel to the creation of PPD-8, two important FEMA documents tie the 
intent of the national preparedness goal to emerging threats and the capabilities 
needed to confront those threats. The “Strategic Foresight Initiative” (SFI) 
comprised a panel of subject matter experts meeting over the course of 2010 and 
2011, to evaluate drivers of threats on the horizon. The panel then used 
scenario-based planning methodology to derive essential capabilities to meet 
multiple possible threats, rather than traditional planning methods that focused 
only on the threat deemed to be most likely to occur. The panel found nine 
factors to be the select drivers of change in the threat landscape. (FEMA SFI 
Summary, 2011, 2–3)  Examining the implications common among the nine 
factors, the panel identified these select emerging needs of the emergency 
management discipline: 
 
• Envisioned changes in emergency and disaster management roles 
and responsibilities will require multi-sector collaboration to meet 
future demands; 
 
• Trust—between the public and government—must be 
strengthened; 
 
• Individuals, families, neighborhoods, communities and the private 
sector will play an increasingly active role in meeting emergency 
management needs; 
 
• New and evolving at-risk populations must be considered in all 
phases of emergency and disaster management; 
 
• Promoting a global mindset will help emergency managers evolve. 
(FEMA SFI Summary, 2011, 4)   
Further, the FEMA SFI 2011 Summary Briefing presentation material 
notes that the advent of technological advances such as smartphones and 
tablets broadens access to information, which empowers individuals and 
promotes a “sharing rather than hierarchical information environment.” (FEMA 
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SFI 2011 Summary Briefing, 4)  Each of these emergent needs highlights a 
particular aspect of collaborative capacity that, taken together, describe the new 
complexities facing emergency managers in developing preparedness skills.   
Following the SFI, FEMA’s “Crisis Response and Disaster Resilience 2030: 
Forging Strategic Action in an Age of Uncertainty” vision document presented the 
analysis of the Initiative and laid out emergent needs of the emergency 
management system. Key elements of future needs are omni-directional 
information sharing across disparate communities and organizations, using 
current technologies and networks; diverse multi-lingual and multi-cultural 
communications capabilities; leveraging volunteers; and building a shared vision 
of future challenges and a shared culture that looks beyond the latest crisis. 
These documents present an emergency management world that in less 
than two decades will look very different from the one two decades past. 
Emergency managers could once feel confident in their preparedness skills if 
they had trained themselves to respond quickly to a crisis, knew the steps to take 
to begin recovery, and created “comprehensive emergency management plans” 
to outline each step they would take in managing a disaster. The lessons of 9/11 
added the need to share intelligence information among public agencies to deter 
terrorist threats, and the need for public safety responders to work together 
interoperably during a catastrophic event. A decade hence, we understand that 
our populations are increasingly diverse and have diverse needs in crisis 
situations; we cannot use a one-size-fits-all approach to evacuation, medical 
surge, sheltering or recovery operations. We also now understand how limited 
our public sector resources really are in disasters, and that the resources 
available in the private sector and volunteer communities are needed to 
strengthen the effectiveness of preparedness and response. 
The SFI findings prescribe the next lesson we must learn to meet the 
evolving demands of the emergency management discipline: that collaboration is 
an essential skill that crosses the core capabilities, as defined in PPD-8, to 
“prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to and recover from 
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those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation.”  In order to 
effectively meet future needs, emergency managers must learn to communicate, 
coordinate and cooperate with each other in such a fashion as to move forward 
jointly ‘from the edge…jumping together’ as Yo Yo Ma might describe.  
1.1.2 Need for Collaborative Capacity 
Cooperation, coordination and communication are skills that served 
emergency managers well in the past, when quick response and recovery 
actions were all that were needed of them. It is collaboration, however, that 
makes partners of stakeholders, and collaboration that makes the network of 
partners move forward together toward prevention of human-caused disasters, 
and resilience of the whole community. Stakeholders need to learn to collaborate 
with each other. Collaboration involves developing deeper relationships based on 
mutual respect and trust. Collaboration involves partnering in such a fashion that 
stakeholders develop a shared vision of the future, and mutually agreeing on 
collective strategies to meet that vision. 
State emergency management agencies need to lead the collaboration 
effort. FEMA and presidential directives provide guidance in desired outcomes 
from a national homeland security perspective, but local emergency managers 
look to states to interpret that guidance and customize it according to each 
state’s priorities and unique set of threats, vulnerabilities and strengths. It is state 
level government that is responsible to find the most effective organizational 
model for leading and managing successful collaborative efforts. 
State emergency management agencies (EMAs) are the hub of a network 
through which all significant emergency preparedness, response and recovery 
actions pass. As can be seen in Figure 1, state EMAs interface with government, 
nongovernment, private sector and community organizations of multiple types 
and levels. For this network to achieve its mission of preparedness and resilience 
to disasters, collaborative capacity is needed for the partners in the network to  
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work effectively together. Since state EMAs are the hub of the network, it could 
be said that those agencies are among those most in need of developing 
collaborative capacities.  
 
Figure 1.   State Emergency Management Agencies are the Hub 
Note:  This figure demonstrates the multitude of government, nongovernment, private sector and 
community organizations of all types and levels with which state emergency management 
agencies must interface and collaborate. 
1.1.3 Collaborative Capacity of Organizations 
The degree to which an organization can collaborate with other entities is 
constrained by the level of collaboration mechanisms it has developed. These 
mechanisms can be broadly organized into five general factors: strategy and 
purpose; people; lateral mechanisms; rewards and incentives; and structure. 
(Hocevar, Thomas, Jansen 2006).  
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The expressed strategy and purpose for collaboration will have a direct 
bearing on whether staff perceive a “felt” need to collaborate (Hocevar et al. 
2006) in order to accomplish an organization’s mission. Starting with strategic 
agreement about the purpose and value of collaboration, organizations 
demonstrate the value placed on collaboration by devoting resources (time and 
money) and taking operational actions that result in collaboration. For example, 
managers plan and schedule meetings with other organizations specifically to 
develop collaboration between the organizations. Another example would be the 
development of mutually agreed protocols for sharing resources in disasters. In 
these examples, organizations demonstrate their strategic agreement about the 
purpose and value of collaboration by seeking mutually beneficial solutions to 
problems, showing respect for different points of view, and collaborating even 
when there are no financial incentives to do so. 
The value placed on individual collaboration skills during the hiring 
process will greatly influence how people in the organization collaborate, and 
how the organization collaborates as a whole. The emergent requirements of 
emergency management agencies demand that all levels of an agency be 
capable of collaborating effectively with partner organizations and communities. 
The more value an organization places on collaboration skills in recruiting and 
selecting staff, the higher the level of individual collaboration competency in the 
organization. 
A third factor is the lateral mechanisms an organization develops for 
training together and for information sharing, for building relationships internally 
across the organization and externally with other stakeholders to create social 
capital. “As relationships develop, social capital accumulates in the form of 
increased respect, trust, information exchange, and mutual understanding, all of 
which contribute to increased success in collaboration and an increase in what 
we call collaborative capacity.” (Hocevar et al. 2006). Use of social media and 
other common technologies serves as a good example of a lateral mechanism to 
increase information sharing among organizations and build social capital.  
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A fourth factor is incentives and rewards for collaboration, which can come 
from within or outside an organization. For example, value placed on 
collaboration skills during promotions can be perceived as an internal reward 
system for staff desiring promotions to higher levels of responsibility or authority. 
Another example of an internal incentive would be the training offered to staff in 
partnering skills or the use of social media tools and technologies. The Urban 
Area Security Initiative (UASI) federal grant program requirement of regional 
collaboration across urban area partners provides an example of an external 
incentive. 
Finally, structure can be a factor in collaborative capacity. A formalized 
structure for collaboration may be in place, by itself or as part of an expressed 
strategy for collaboration. Institutionalized policies and procedures for 
collaboration may be in place. Among the five factors, a structure for 
collaboration may be the most difficult to discern without an in-depth study of an 
organization. It also may be closely tied to an organization’s overall structure. 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis addresses two questions. First, how well are state-level 
emergency management agencies meeting the emerging collaborative demands 
of the discipline?  Taking the FEMA SFI and vision documents as a guide to 
emerging needs of the emergency management discipline, this research looks 
across the broad organizational categories of state emergency management 
requirements and uses state EMA staff input to provide a self-assessment of 
their organizations’ progress in meeting the emerging needs.  
The second research question asks whether the military-based vs. civilian-
based organizational structure of the state EMA affects how well agencies are 
meeting the emerging requirements for collaboration. 
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1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
During the 2012 devastating fires that consumed the Colorado Springs 
area, it was reported2 that thousands of evacuation phone calls to endangered 
citizens were not completed or were not answered. As the Waldo Canyon Fire 
moved closer to Colorado Springs, a reverse notification system that initially had 
13,000 registered users jumped to 52,000, but more than 20,000 calls—two 
thirds of the impacted population—were never delivered. 
Thousands of wildfire warnings undelivered in Colo. More than 
20,000 evacuation calls were never delivered to residents in the 
path of a wildfire that destroyed about 350 homes around Colorado 
Springs, Colorado in June, records show, according to the 
Associated Press, July 10. It was the second time in 5 months that 
Colorado residents said they did not get calls to pack up and run as 
flames raced toward their homes. Officials in El Paso and Teller 
counties were trying to determine why two-thirds of the 32,000 
impacted residents did not receive calls during the Waldo Canyon 
fire that began June 23. Nearly 10,000 attempts to reach residents 
in Colorado Springs were abandoned after the calls were not 
completed, and more than 11,000 calls were not answered, 
according to records obtained by KMGH 7 Denver. Cassidian 
Communications, the reverse notification provider, said some calls 
were not completed because of heavy volume. Phone company 
officials said their phones were working fine at the time. A 
spokesman for the El Paso/Teller County E911 said his agency will 
hold meetings to discuss the problem. The system had 13,000 
people registered in its cellphone database before the wildfire, 
officials said. That jumped to 52,000 as homes were burned, and at 
one point, 1,000 residents per hour were registering their mobile 
numbers, the Denver Post reported.  About 12 percent of the 
people authorities intended to notify didn’t get a warning, a sheriff’s 
spokesman said. The company that handles that system, Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana-based FirstCall Network, Inc., said the process 
worked exactly as it should have. 
It would be difficult to find a more compelling example of the need for 
collaboration than this problematic evacuation notice in Colorado Springs. In the 
                                                 
2 Thousands of wildfire warnings undelivered in Colo.  Source: 
http://columbustelegram.com/news/national/thousands-of-wildfire-warnings-undelivered-in-
colo/article_bfcdd02f-8b92-56fc-b5d6-51bfd1dd9543.html. 
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aftermath of the incident, the cause of which was undetermined, the news brief 
mentioned these stakeholders: Colorado residents (this was the second time that 
residents of the state had failed to receive fire evacuation notifications); the City 
of Colorado Springs; El Paso and Teller Counties; reverse notification provider 
Cassdian Communications; El Paso/Teller County E911; phone company 
officials; a county sheriff’s office; and First Call Network, Inc., the apparent 
provider of reverse notification registration services. In all, six separate public 
sector offices and three private sector companies were involved in this single 
communications incident, not to mention the thousands of uninformed citizens 
themselves.  Recognizing this failure, the City of Colorado Springs in its initial 
after action report described an “immediate need” to study the capacity of its 
current public warning notification system.3  
The preceding example is offered to illustrate the need for collaboration 
among emergency management stakeholders. In the stakeholder network, states 
are ultimately the entities that citizens, and local and federal governments, look 
to as being responsible for all parts of the system working together. States must 
navigate decreasing tax revenues; reduced federal funding support; increasing 
populations; businesses that want tax breaks in order to keep the jobs they 
sustain within the state; more frequent and more costly disasters; and local 
emergency management agencies that have more resources at their disposal 
than the state does. To do this effectively, state emergency management 
agencies must be able leverage all of the resources at their disposal, and to do 
that, they must possess collaborative capacity. 
No two state governments are alike. States have many options for 
organizing and structuring their core functions. When it comes to options for 
organizing public safety, emergency management and homeland security 
functions, very little is understood about smart practices for these functions 
                                                 
3 City of Colorado Springs Waldo Canyon Fire Initial After Action Report.  October 23, 2012.  
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specifically at the state level. Much has been written about the requirements of 
the emergency management discipline, but not at the individual state level. When 
homeland security became a recognized discipline after 9/11, some research 
was done regarding how homeland security functions could and should be 
incorporated into, or coordinated with, state emergency management functions. 
(e.g., Woodbury, 2004)  However, the number and variety of state emergency 
management and homeland security organizational models that now exist 
suggest that no apparent best practice models have emerged. 
The research for this thesis investigates current level of collaborative 
capacity at the state EMA level. It is hoped that the audience for this research—
state governors, state legislators, and state homeland security and emergency 
management practitioners—will benefit from the findings. It is also hoped that 
future students of the homeland security enterprise will build on this research to 
determine the factors that encourage and inhibit collaborative capacity growth at 
the state EMA level; to find demonstrable best practices for state EMA 
collaborations with the communities they serve, and to understand the role that 
organizational structure plays in collaborative capacity growth. Lastly, it is hoped 
that federal partners may use this research to accelerate our movement toward a 
prepared, resilient nation. 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
Chapter 2.0 presents a review of the federal strategic and visioning 
documents that define emerging needs of the emergency management discipline. 
Collaborative capacity is shown to be the common requirement across all of the 
emerging needs. Collaborative capacity is explained and related to organizations, 
to homeland security, and to state-level emergency management. This review of 
the literature surrounding emerging needs, collaborative capacity, and the role of 
state-level emergency management informs the general questions of the  
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research and the specific questions of the survey instrument used for the 
research. Chapter 2.0 also presents an overview of existing state EMA 
organizational structures. 
Chapter 3.0 presents the design and conduct of the research. State 
emergency management staff in all fifty states were contacted directly by email 
and offered an opportunity to participate in an anonymous web-based survey. 
The survey was designed to differentiate state EMAs by organizational type, 
pulse staff for opinions on how they felt their state EMAs were faring in the 
activities of meeting emerging needs of the emergency management discipline, 
and to allow a comparison of the results by the reporting structure of the office 
(governor, public safety, military, etc.). 
Survey questions were based on emerging needs of the emergency 
management discipline as defined in national documents such as the FEMA SFI 
and vision statements.  Questions were clustered under the topics of: strategic 
actions for collaboration; operational actions for collaboration; collaborating with 
local/diverse communities; collaborating with volunteers; collaborating with the 
private sector; building social capital; and using social media for collaboration. 
Questions were posed as positive statements with a 6-point Likert scale of 
response between “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree.”  Three open-ended 
questions offered the opportunity for elaboration or comment. 
Chapter 4.0, Data and Analysis, explains the survey results and analysis 
of the findings. Staff in the emergency management agencies of all fifty states 
were contacted and provided the opportunity to participate. A response rate of 
thirty percent was achieved. Self-report ratings were used to generate an overall 
picture of the collaborative capacities in the seven different domains of 
collaboration described above. The different organizational structures of state 
EMAs were well represented in the responses, offering confidence in the analysis 
that organizational structure makes a difference in state EMA collaborative 
capacity. 
  17 
Chapter 5.0, Conclusions and Recommendations, summarizes the survey 
results, draws overall conclusions, and provides recommendations based on 
findings along with indicators of the need for further research. 
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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter examines the literature exploring current and future needs of 
the emergency management discipline, collaboration as a core capability 
required by current and future needs of the discipline, the evolving role of 
emergency management at the state level, and current state emergency 
management agency organizational structures. 
Emerging needs of the emergency management discipline are outlined 
through an examination of recent presidential preparedness directives and DHS 
and FEMA forward-looking initiatives. This literature review pulls common 
themes from the federal documents and highlights those that require 
collaborative capacity to meets the emerging needs. Federal documents are 
intended to provide guidance that applies across the federal, state, local and 
tribal levels of the emergency management network. Few documents can be 
found that address emerging needs specifically at the state level. Thus, the 
Researcher makes the assumption that federal documents provide the greatest 
source emergency management visioning in the United States, for application at 
any level in the network. 
There is extensive literature to be found on collaboration, collaborative 
capacity, and the need for collaboration in government at all levels. This literature 
review narrows the focus on collaboration to organizational collaborative capacity 
determination as modeled by Hocevar, Thomas and Jansen (2006). This 
determination model was chosen for its prior use in military/defense-based 
organizations.  Other samples of collaboration literature from the Naval 
Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense master’s curriculum were 
chosen to augment the research of Jansen et al. 
States play a critical role in emergency preparedness. Since there is little 
literature addressing the evolving role of emergency management specifically at 
the state level, this section of the literature reviews draws from overall sources 
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describing the civil defense history of the emergency management discipline in 
the U.S., assumptions existing in the discipline that can be traced to that history, 
and emerging needs of the discipline that highlight those assumptions and 
compel re-examination of the assumptions. Although the assumptions can be 
found embedded throughout the emergency management discipline at all levels, 
they are particularly worth examining at the state level because states are the 
only level of emergency management that still organize their emergency 
management agencies within military/defense organizations. Finally, existing 
state EMA organizational structures are examined through very limited sources 
of available data. 
2.1 PPD-8: NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS 
President Barack Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8: 
National Preparedness on March 30, 2011, to outline the need for a single 
national preparedness goal, system, and measurement mechanism to ensure 
disaster resilience from a national perspective. The resulting National 
Preparedness Goal (2011) reshaped the core capabilities needed for national 
preparedness, calling for a reinvigorated approach to terrorism prevention 
activities that requires “extensive collaboration with government and 
nongovernmental entities, international partners and the private sector.”  
Following the National Preparedness Goal (2011), a National 
Preparedness System (2011) is being developed to “enable a collaborative, 
whole community approach to national preparedness that engages individuals, 
families, communities, private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations 
and all levels of government.”  The mechanism for building this system is a set of 
National Planning Frameworks for prevention, protection, mitigation, response 
and recovery to be developed collaboratively. These frameworks have been 
drafted and made open for public review and comment, but the final versions 
have not yet been released. Here are samples of language from each of the five 
draft frameworks, citing the need for collaboration: 
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 The [Working Draft] National Prevention Framework 
“…provides guidance to intelligence and law enforcement 
professionals on how existing structures, such as the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Join Terrorism Task Forces 
(JTTFs), state and major area fusion centers, state and local 
counterterrorism and intelligence units, can collaborate and 
prioritize their efforts to support the delivery of Protection core 
capabilities.” (4) 
 
 The [Working Draft] National Protection Framework includes 
“…coordinating and collaborating with international partners and 
organizations to promote risk-based principles and coordinated 
protective efforts” and “implement risk-informed guidelines, 
regulations and standards to ensure the security, reliability, integrity 
and availability of critical information, records, and communication 
systems and services through collaborative cyber security initiatives 
and efforts.” (17) 
 
 The [Working Draft] National Mitigation Framework defines 
collaboration as “a broad engagement and on-going dialogue about 
threats and vulnerabilities and meaningful, sustained participation 
in community planning and decision making.” (5)  The Framework 
states that “opportunities for mitigation draw together stakeholders 
with varied interests and backgrounds and depend on a 
commitment to collaboration.” (16)  It further asserts that for this 
Framework, “community resilience involves multiple capabilities, 
with communication, collaboration and decentralized civic 
engagement down to the individual level.” (15) 
  
  22 
 The [Working Draft] National Response Framework, as revised 
from its 2008 publication, defines roles for emergency managers, at 
every level of the response system. It also calls out the specific 
responsibilities of federal, state, tribal, local, nongovernmental 
(NGO), private sector and volunteer organizations in collaborating 
with “mutual transparency” during disaster response. 
 
 The [Initial Draft] National Disaster Recovery Framework 
(NDRF) Interagency Operational Plan (IOP) states that the NDRF 
establishes the coordinating structure to “enhance recovery 
collaboration and coordination in support of disaster-impacted 
communities” (10) providing a flexible structure that “enables 
disaster recovery managers to operate in a unified and 
collaborative manner” (40) in identifying opportunities for 
interagency collaboration. The document reinforces the call for 
“mutually transparent” and collaborative operations between federal 
and state entities. It also explains that recovery forums (e.g., 
Economic Development Assessment Team (EDAT)) are 
“interagency engagements that provide community or regional 
collaboration with local stakeholders to discuss, explore and 
strategize solutions to economic recovery issues.” (22)  
Each of these frameworks, and the system they comprise, usher in a 
stronger emphasis on collaboration, and a more comprehensive focus on the 
whole community, than ever before. 
2.1.1 Whole Community Approach 
We’re going to succeed as a team, or we’re going to fail as a team: 
even if FEMA does everything right, we can’t succeed without the 
team. 
W. Craig Fugate, FEMA Administrator  
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In A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, 
Themes and Pathways for Action (FEMA, 2011), FEMA Administrator Craig 
Fugate explained that we can no longer rely on a government-centric approach 
to disaster response, and that we must fully engage the capacities of our entire 
society. Doing so will require emergency managers to understand the daily life 
complexities of communities in order to collaborate with communities and 
properly serve their needs.  
This is no small task for state emergency managers who may typically 
depend on local EMAs to develop relationships at the community level. The 
strategic prescription in A Whole Community Approach is for emergency 
managers to: 
 
• Understand community complexity; 
• Recognize community capabilities and needs;  
• Foster relationships with community leaders;  
• Build and maintain partnerships;  
• Empower local action; and  
• Leverage and strengthen social infrastructure, networks and 
assets. (FEMA, 2011, 5) 
To do this, state EMAs need to enter a world quite different from simply 
managing state emergency operations centers (EOCs) during disasters, listing 
hazardous chemical sites and writing program-required plans. New skills for 
collaboration must be developed in state EMA organizations, and those skills 
must be clearly valued in the hiring and promotion process. Resources—time 
and money—must be applied to learning these new skills.  
Chia (2010) offers practical advice for community outreach, suggesting 
that emergency managers work to identify community newcomers and 
immigrants. Chia asserts that community leadership can be strengthened and 
made more resilient if emergency managers learn to communicate with 
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immigrant communities within their cultural and language contexts. State 
emergency managers should work in concert with local emergency management, 
law enforcement and community representatives to find ways of reinforcing 
cultural norms while bridging the common goal of building resilience. 
State agencies involved in strengthening the health, social and economic 
well-being of local communities already understand many of the values, 
complexities and nuances of daily community life. State EMAs need to develop 
deeper partnerships with their state agency partners to draw upon rich resources 
for building new collaboration skills. For example, state EMA leadership can 
make a priority of regular meetings specifically for the purpose of interagency 
collaboration; doing so would increase the social capital of all state agencies as 
well as intensify the resources directed at community resilience. 
The benefits of a whole community approach for states are great, not just 
in more efficient use of resources but also for slimming budgets in hard economic 
times. As A Whole Community Approach notes, ”the pooling of efforts and 
resources across the whole community is a way to compensate for budgetary 
pressures, not only for government agencies but also for many private and 
nonprofit sector organizations.” (FEMA, 2011, p4)   
2.1.2 Regional Resource Sharing 
Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8 mentions the need for interagency 
coordination for rapid integration and sharing of personnel in disasters. It does 
not mention the sharing of other types of resources. However, FEMA has 
expanded on the concept of shared resources by requiring states to list regionally 
and nationally deployable assets. In the federal fiscal year (FFY) 2012 Homeland 
Security Grant Program (HSGP) Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA), 
FEMA states that any proposed projects developing new capabilities will have to 
identify how new assets will be shared outside their immediate areas and support 
national needs. The phrase “nationally deployable resources” has been used 
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many times in recent national teleconferences and presentations by FEMA 
Grants Program Directorate Assistant Administrator Elizabeth Harman. 
Without further definition of what the phrase “nationally deployable” 
constitutes, it remains to be seen how this requirement will play out in the FFY 
2012 HSGP. Nevertheless, this language is pointing in the direction of further 
collaboration among state EMAs, and collaboration between state and federal 
emergency management. State and territorial EMAs, who have through the past 
many years created disaster mutual aid agreements under EMAC (Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact) are now required to participate in EMAC in 
order to receive federal grant funding. FEMA is attempting to institutionalize 
collaboration in the administration of homeland security grant programs. 
2.1.3 Social Capital, Networks and Media 
Sociologist Russell Dynes (2005) asserts that the social networks already 
in place before a disaster and are even more robust during a crisis and provide 
the basis for community resilience. Dynes (2005) believes that emergency 
managers must recognize that individuals are not helpless in disasters and that 
communities do not need to be commanded and controlled.  
Dynes (2005) found that, of all the forms of capital considered in 
emergency management, social capital is stronger than all other forms of capital 
in disasters, and thus provides a primary basis of community resilience. Dynes 
(2005) noted that in daily life, citizens do not experience many duties and 
obligations of citizenship, but in disasters they are challenged to help each other 
in their times of need. Crises provide opportunities for citizens to strengthen their 
ties with their communities and to demonstrate citizenship, providing for 
community growth and strengthening.  
Thoughts expressed in the FEMA Strategic Plan 2011-2014 support 
Dynes’ assertions. “Communities will organize themselves to deal with crises in 
much the same way as they organize to deal with daily challenges. By working 
together with new partners and focusing on strengthening what works well in 
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communities on a daily basis, we can advance creative solutions that build 
collective Whole Community disaster management capabilities and help 
strengthen the nation’s resilience.”  Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche and 
Pfefferbaum (2007) also support Dynes’ views that “pre-existing organizational 
networks and relationships are the key to rapidly mobilizing emergency and on-
going support services for disaster survivors,” noting that collaboration is 
essential for collective action and decision making. 
Dynes (2005) dispels the popular notion that individuals have conflicting 
roles in disasters; that they are always forced to choose between work roles and 
family roles. Dynes describes a general assumption in the disaster management 
literature that persons would abandon their work roles, especially those roles 
within emergency management organizations. However, he purports that 
research proves this assumption inaccurate and that individuals adapt both work 
and family roles in crisis situations. Dynes (2005) argues that the obligations and 
expectations of individual work and family roles within community units are in and 
of themselves a form of social capital and a basis for adaption. Adaption of roles 
during disasters is evidence of resilience, and should be studied closely by state 
emergency managers in order to exploit the use of individuals within their 
communities in leading response activities. 
Bach, Doran, Gibb, Kaufman and Settle (2010) agree that a centralized 
authority approach to disasters, with an over-reliance on government over 
personal responsibility, prevents the flexibility needed to confront today’s 
complex incidents. However, their findings in studies of resilient community 
response to disasters in the U.S. and U.K. would challenge Dynes’ assumption of 
community resilience. Bach, et al. (2010) believes governments need to 
understand the complexities and fragmentation that often exist in their 
communities. Such fragmentation makes it difficult to build the trust across 
groups and institutions that communities need to build social capital for effective 
resilience in emergencies. (Bach, et al. 2010) 
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Bach, et al. (2010) purport that a shift is needed in state-civil society 
relations. They argue that public participation should lead in identifying priorities, 
organizing support, implementing programs and evaluating outcomes. This shift 
is supported by recent examples of disaster response utilizing social media, such 
as Japanese citizens finding rescue and medical help through Twitter.  
In fact, the wide acceptance and use of new social media technologies 
such as Twitter and Facebook provide a ready-made avenue for state EMAs to 
tap the resources of empowered citizens ‘leading, not following.’  “We need to 
move away from the mindset that Federal and State governments are always in 
the lead,” says FEMA Administrator Fugate, “and build upon the strengths of our 
local communities, and more importantly, our citizens.” (Fugate, FEMA 2011, 10)  
Social media such as Twitter and Facebook allow citizens to push instant 
disaster information to the whole community. State EMAs have thus far done little 
to tap this resource, preferring instead to gather information by traditional means, 
and then pronounce it only when multiple layers of authority have signed off on it. 
(Hartman 2012) 
A key desired outcome identified in the FEMA Strategic Plan 2011-2014 is 
to “successfully seed innovative grassroots resilience-building activities in 
communities across the country.”   An idea for such an activity would be the co-
development of “apps” for smartphones that would be useful for public alerts, or 
for sharing information during the chaotic aftermath of a disaster. State EMAs 
could partner with other state agencies to work with communities to better 
understand their needs, especially for public alerts and warnings, in crisis 
situations. (Gusty 2011)  Based on this information, they could then partner with 
colleges and private software developers to create apps, including collaboration 
with local arts organizations and her community groups not traditionally involved 
in emergency preparedness collaborations. (FEMA 2011) 
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2.2 TERRORISM PREVENTION: MOVING “LEFT OF BOOM” 
“Preventing, avoiding or stopping a threatened or…actual act of terrorism” 
is the prevention mission area defined in the National Preparedness Goal (2011). 
Graphically illustrated by Lawrenson Smith LLC in Figure 2, the intent of the 
homeland security enterprise is to focus activity and resources “left of boom” by 
preventing, protecting against, or limiting the impact of terrorist acts.  
 
LAWRENSON SMITH LLC 
proprietary  
 
Figure 2.   Left of Boom 
Used with permission of Paul Smith, Lawrenson Smith LLC. 
Note:  This figure demonstrates four phases of countering and reacting to an Improvised Explosive Device 
(IED), with emphasis on the steps taken by terrorists to plan extreme violent acts and the corresponding 
steps which must be taken by law enforcement, emergency management and other homeland security 
practitioners. 
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Figure 1 dramatically illustrates the steps required to prevent the extreme 
violent attacks often used by terrorists. Each of these steps, from the denial of 
resources for creating improvised explosive devices, to the disruption of a device 
before it is deployed, requires the collaboration of law enforcement, other 
government partners, private sector and individual citizens in spotting suspicious 
behaviors, confirming intent to harm and in preventing the actors from carrying 
out their intent. (Executive Office of the President 2011)  Recent DHS literature 
on countering violent extremism such as the 2011 DHS “Approach to Countering 
Violent Extremism” emphasizes the ability of law enforcement and government 
agencies to work with local communities to spot behaviors that indicate potential 
extremist activity.  
As outlined in the NPG, the core capabilities required to achieve the 
prevention mission area are planning; public information and warning; forensics 
and attribution; intelligence and information sharing; interdiction and disruption; 
and screening, search and detection. Although these core capabilities may seem 
law enforcement-centric, the NPG makes clear that core capabilities are the 
province of the whole community, and not the responsibility of any one function 
of government or public safety. “Ensuring the security of the homeland requires 
the execution of terrorism prevention through extensive collaboration with 
government and nongovernmental entities, international partners and the private 
sector.” (NPG 2011) 
To prevent radicalization of youth that often leads to extreme violent acts, 
law enforcement agencies are challenged by increasingly diverse local 
communities to learn the skills needed to build communities of trust. Building 
trust requires development of language skills and expression of respect for 
privacy and civil rights and liberties. As Wasserman (2010) states, “meaningful 
dialogue and collaboration with communities needs to occur in a manner that 
increases the legitimacy of the agency in the eyes of that community.” (p3) 
Correspondingly, state fusion centers must learn, by working with diverse local 
communities, “the difference between behavior that is indicative of…terrorist 
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activity and that which is constitutionally protected to prevent improper or 
inaccurate assumptions.”  (Wasserman 2010)   
2.3 FEMA STRATEGIC FORESIGHT INITIATIVE 
The FEMA SFI, conducted within the broader public and private sector 
emergency management community during 2010-11, resulted in the publication 
of Crisis Response and Disaster Resilience 2030: Forging Strategic Action in an 
Age of Uncertainty. This document presents the essential capabilities emergency 
managers and homeland security practitioners need, regardless of how global 
economic, environmental and other issues play out over the next two decades.  
The new, augmented or different emergency management capabilities identified 
in this report are summarized below:  
(1) “Dynamic and unprecedented shifts in local and regional population 
characteristics and migratory flows” (FEMA 2012, 13) will require building multi-
lingual proficiencies and understanding risks associated with heavily populated 
coastal areas and urban centers, and more remote locations where new 
population centers are forming. Building this capability requires close dialogue 
with community leaders to better understand local needs, and will mean involving 
traditionally underrepresented populations in planning and service delivery. 
(2) Omni-directional information sharing is a necessity. (13)  Information 
created and distributed by government must remain relevant to the public. This 
will involve utilizing complex information and media environments, and staying 
abreast of rapidly evolving social networks and knowing how to leverage their 
power and influence.  
(3) Partnering with individuals and community organizations is essential to 
build capacity for self-reliance and individual initiative. (14)  Individuals must be 
empowered to assume more responsibility as government resources continue to 
dwindle. Core to this effort is partnering with local communities to shape K-12  
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curricula for building self-reliance skills in children and families. This will involve 
developing collaborative relationships with communities and individuals at a 
grass roots level. 
(4) Fostering a culture that embraces forward thinking and “futures” 
knowledge. (14)  Operational and leadership training must support this culture by 
including the skills and tools to build a shared vision for the emergency 
management community of the future. Anticipation of emerging challenges must 
be engrained in organizations to develop appropriate plans and contingencies. 
This will require collaboration skills in building shared vision. 
(5) Creatively incorporating technology to inform and organize volunteers 
is needed to leverage volunteer capabilities across all emergency management 
phases. (15)  This involves understanding the limitations and risks of utilizing 
volunteers and how to mitigate them, as well as understanding and adopting 
appropriate technologies.  
(6) Proactively engaging business in all emergency management phases, 
and soliciting its contribution to policy development, is essential to protect private 
sector critical infrastructures and ensure their resilience. (15)  Policy collaboration 
will require skills beyond the building of public-private agreements for emergency 
response; it will require partnerships built on strong relationships and mutual trust. 
The six capabilities highlighted here have a common theme: developing 
them requires improving collaborative capacities in emergency management. 
This necessity is reinforced by other sources in the literature. The NPG released 
by DHS in 2011 reshaped the core capabilities needed for national preparedness, 
calling for a reinvigorated approach to terrorism prevention activities that requires 
“extensive collaboration with government and nongovernmental entities, 
international partners and the private sector.” (DHS 2011)  In the FEMA Whole 
Community Approach (2011), Administrator Craig Fugate explained that we can 
no longer rely on a government-centric approach to disaster response and so we 
must “engage our entire societal capacity.”  (FEMA 2011)  Doing so will require 
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emergency managers to understand the daily life complexities of communities in 
order to collaborate with communities to serve their needs.  
To meet the vision of the SFI, the new core capabilities will require 
“…creative and collaborative thinking and action” of emergency management 
planners that are “motivated and empowered to look beyond short-term concerns 
and narrow stovepipes and recognize opportunities for collaboration around 
shared interest.” (FEMA 2012) Emergency managers must sharpen collaboration 
skills to meet these needs, and look for ways to institutionalize collaboration 
throughout their organizations. 
2.4 COLLABORATION AS A CORE CAPABILITY 
The common theme throughout PPD-8 documents, the FEMA SFI and 
resulting future vision statements demonstrates that collaboration is a core 
capability essential for every partner in the national preparedness network.  
Kaiser (2011) indicated that reasons for the “current upsurge [in 
interagency collaboration] are the growth in government responsibilities, cross-
cutting programs, and their complexity; certain crises which showed severe 
limitations of existing structures; and heightened pressure to reduce the size of 
federal programs and expenditures.”  These reasons support the view that 
improved collaboration is called for not only for emergency preparedness needs 
but also due to shrinking government budgets.  
A National Association of Public Administration (NAPA) panel has defined 
measures need to assure better performance of federal grant-funded state 
homeland security and emergency preparedness projects. (NAPA 2011)  The 
Panel stresses that the very success of the National Preparedness System relies 
on collaboration among the partners but also recognizes that this collaboration 
presents the “greatest weakness” in terms of being able to measure effective 
collaboration. Panel recommendations call for FEMA to assess the collaborative 
practices in coordination with state, local, regional and urban areas, and to “use 
the results to develop scoring systems for future quantitative or qualitative 
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performance measures on collaboration and to assist program participants to 
strengthen their performance on this critical issue.”  Also noted is the opportunity 
to evaluate whether collaboration activities have continued to occur in UASIs that 
have been dropped from FEMA funding in the past two years, and the 
recommendation that FEMA study this closely since institutionalizing of 
collaboration was and is an expected outcome of the UASI grant program. 
(NAPA 2011) 
2.4.1 Collaborative Capacity Defined 
Collaboration is, as Merriam Webster explains, working with other 
agencies or instrumentalities to which one is not immediately connected, 
“especially in an intellectual endeavor.”  Carrasco (2009) defines individual 
collaborative capacity as the “knowledge, skills and attitude required to achieve 
collaborative outcomes” and organizational collaborative capacity as the “culture 
and processes required to support collaboration.” 
Hocevar, Fann, and Thomas (2006) define collaborative capacity as “the 
ability of organizations to enter into, develop and sustain inter-organizational 
systems in pursuit of collective outcomes.”   (Jansen et al. 2008) further describe 
that “inter-organizational collaboration comprises a system of processes by which 
organizations work together to accomplish common or complementary goals and 
objectives or a common mission” and that “collaboration is often used 
synonymously with partnering and is manifest when organizations form 
alliances.” 
These collective definitions serve to illustrate that collaborative capacity 
has definable or measurable outcomes; requires “attitude” or perceived value of 
collaboration; and requires skills, presumably gained through both training and 
experience. The definitions also imply that collaborative capacity is something 
not inherent in organizations and must be learned. Collaboration can be 
confused with coordination, but they are not the same thing. Coordination means 
working together, and centers on communication between coordinating 
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individuals or organizations. Collaboration includes coordination, but adds the 
element of a definable or measurable outcome that would not have been 
achievable without the collaboration between the individuals or organizations. 
2.4.2 Collaborative Capacity of Organizations 
Kuznar (2009) explored collaboration in various structural forms from an 
anthropological point of view, and explained that, for successful collaboration to 
occur, benefits or incentives for collaboration must be sustained in each of the 
various organizations with a purpose to collaborate. Kuznar looked at the 
concept of sodalities, or “collaborative societies” based on kinship or nonkin 
criteria, and explained that “maintaining collaboration within or between sodalities 
requires sustenance of benefits to the various organizations, and of rewards to 
the individuals who ultimately need to perform actions that serve an 
organizational purpose.”  (Kuznar 2009)  This indicates that organizations and 
individuals within those organizations need incentives and rewards as motivators 
for collaboration, and that there must be perceived benefits or value of 
collaboration in order for it to occur. 
The need for perceived benefit in order for collaboration to occur in 
organizations is echoed in the framework for assessing collaborative capacity by 
Jansen, Hocevar, Rendon, and Thomas (2008). A perception of the value of 
collaboration, or a “felt need” resulting in such benefits as shared resources or 
the achievement of common goals, creates organizational purpose for 
collaboration and must be in place for effective collaboration to occur. Other 
factors must also be in place: incentives and rewards to reinforce the value of 
collaboration; trust, competency, commitment and respect for others’ views 
among the people in the organization; lateral mechanisms that foster regular 
communication and relationship building between organizations; and a formal 
structure that allows sufficient authority for participation and leadership of 
collaborative efforts. (Jansen, Hocevar, Rendon, and Thomas 2008) 
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2.4.3 Collaborative Capacity in Homeland Security 
Jardine (2010) noted that collaboration has been a growing theme in 
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) guidance since 2003. Donahue, 
Cunnion, Balaban and Sochats (2012) claim emergency managers must base 
response planning on community needs rather than threats, adding that needs 
must be defined by local communities and not the responders. “Public perception 
of needs satisfaction is critical” say Donahue et al., “because it drives public 
opinion, trust and confidence in response capabilities.” (Donahue et al. 2012, 3)  
Kasapoglu, Mileti and Deflem (2008) researched the impact on disaster response 
of inter-organizational and intra-organizational structures and cultures in the 
broader emergency management community, attempting to find a model or 
models that would serve as a predictor for effective response to attacks such as 
those on 9/11. 
Pelfrey (2005) asserts that collaboration is the “most essential element” in 
the prevention phase of the Cycle of Preparedness framework for preparing for 
terrorist attacks. Pelfrey states that “those who would attack this nation are likely 
to seek unusual vulnerabilities, surprise, and use novel methods,” the effects of 
which can be prevented through regular and methodic collaboration among the 
organizations in the preparedness network.  
Even the military recognizes the need for increasing collaboration. Harm 
and Hunt (2009) indicate the military understands the need to change its view of 
collaboration and expand it beyond just collaboration between branches of the 
service. “New and expanded horizontal collaboration” within modern culture “is 
forcing the military to revaluate the impacts and implementation within their 
traditional hierarchical system.” (Harm and Hunt 2009) 
2.5 EVOLVING ROLE OF STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT  
There is scant literature that focuses specifically on the role of emergency 
management at the state level. Therefore, the emergency management literature 
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selected for this research was chosen for its relevance to emerging needs of the 
discipline, and applied where possible to the functioning of state EMAs. 
At a 2003 Emergency Manager of the Future roundtable, University of 
Denver sociology professor Thomas Drabek noted that changes in population 
diversity, environmental issues and technology development will challenge the 
emergency managers of the future to “grasp the big picture but not be controlled 
by it.”  (Hite 2003)  Nine years hence, from a review of presidential directives, 
national preparedness objectives and FEMA strategic vision documents, it 
appears that as a nation we are finally grasping the big picture. At the state level, 
however, it is difficult to say whether EMAs may be headed in the direction of 
controlling or being controlled by the big picture. Little research can be found that 
shows state EMAs recognize the need for collaborative capacity for building core 
capabilities for the future. By the same token, no literature can be found that says 
state EMAs don’t recognize the need. Lack of research literature in this area 
points to a gaping need for academic research. 
There are potential legal implications to states of failing to evolve. 
Preparedness and response planning has always been a key function of 
emergency managers and is often a codified state public safety requirement. 
Nicholson (2007) explains that the size and scope of plans is different for each 
locale but that “minimum standards are steadily becoming more stringent.”  
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) guidance documents (for programs in 
federal fiscal years 2011 and 2012) now require state and UASI strategic plans 
be updated every two years at a minimum. Plans must reflect lessons learned 
from incidents and exercises, or may subject an agency to claims of negligence if 
citizens or property are harmed in future incidents as a result of the agency’s 
failure to plan. (Brill 2011)  
The 2006 DHS National Plan Review evaluated and criticized state 
performance of their emergency management duties. Nicholson (2007) claims 
these criticisms constitute legal notice to states of their liabilities with regard to 
emergency management. In governmental emergency management agencies, 
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claims of negligence typically result from failure to fully perform generally 
accepted agency duties and expectations. This includes failure to plan, and 
failure to continually review and revise plans to meet changing needs and 
situations. (Nicholson 2007)  In fact, the number two defect found in emergency 
management plans documented by the National Plan Review was that “state and 
urban areas are not conducting adequate collaborative planning as a part of 
‘steady state’ preparedness.” (DHS National Plan Review 2006, 62) This 
literature points to clear ramifications for state EMAs failing to uphold their duties 
to plan, to prepare, and to collaborate with stakeholders in these activities. 
In addition to the National Plan review, DHS has adopted the Lessons 
Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) website to aggregate the lessons learned 
and observed in exercises and in actual incidents. Lessons describing the need 
for better collaboration, management of volunteers and donations, working more 
closely with the private sector, and use of social media for all phases of 
emergency management abound on the LLIS website and in every emergency 
management blog, professional association website and industry publication. 
There is no shortage of information available to state EMAs updating 
comprehensive plans according to clear mandates for capabilities improvement. 
As an example, the following excerpt from a recent Rapid City Journal 
article reflects on state EMA lessons learned from the 2011 Missouri River flood 
response in South Dakota, a year after the flood occurred.  
 
Emergency a tough test  
The flood tested South Dakota's emergency response capability. A 
year later, the state has a good idea what it did right — and what 
needs to be improved, said Kristi Turman, the state's emergency 
management director. 
‘We did it, but it wasn't pretty,’ Turman said. "We've streamlined the 
process. We've actually tested it, and it seems to work the way we 
want it to." 
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In a future disaster, state officials will try to make better use of 
websites and social media to get out information, Turman said. 
State officials also came to realize that volunteer agencies can play 
a vital part in recovery. Those organizations bring donated 
manpower, money and materials. 
During the flood, though, ‘we didn't have anyone on staff devoted 
full time to coordinating with those entities, finding out what they 
have to offer and how to get it here,’ Turman said. "We have shifted 
staff around and added that position." 
Another challenge arose when state officials tried to reach out to 
the informal homeowners associations in unincorporated housing 
developments such as Riv-R-Land. 
‘They didn't have a structure we could go to formally to give them 
information,’ Turman said. ‘That lack of government structure down 
there made it more difficult. It was a challenge we honestly hadn't 
dealt with before.’ (Woster 2012) 
This excerpt is offered as an example of after-action report comments all 
too common in modern disasters: coordination with multiple stakeholders to 
move vast amounts of resources to those in need; use of websites and social 
media for crisis communications; volunteer management; and attempting 
connections with local communities during disasters when no pre’disaster 
connections had been established. 
One reason for lack of collaborative planning in state EMAs may be 
incorrect beliefs or skewed histories about the need to control the public when 
crises occur. Dynes (1994) asserts that emergency planning is universally based 
on false assumptions that disasters generate social chaos, and must be 
managed through command and control actions. This dominant planning model 
assumes weakness in individuals and social structures that must be “returned to 
normalcy” through control of the people and situation in order for the disaster to 
be over. (Dynes 1994)  Dynes (2005) explained that the roles individuals play 
within their communities during a disaster are stronger versions of the same roles 
they play normally. He argues that typical emergency management command-
and-control response plans call for creating a new response network for each 
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disaster, but that this is actually the opposite of what should be done since the 
social networks that provide resilience to disasters are already in place before a 
disaster, and in fact are even more robust during a crisis. (Dynes 2005)   
Horwitz (2008) asserts that even in disaster response, command and 
control may not be the most desired capability; instead it may be the agility that 
organizations can achieve from decentralization such as that found in the private 
sector and in the U.S. Coast Guard. “Disaster researchers have accused FEMA 
and other government agencies of being overly conservative and ‘rule-bound’ in 
the face of a disaster that required not just discipline, but agility.” (Horwitz 2008)   
Horwitz and Dynes come from different points of view but agree that a certain 
amount of discipline is needed in disaster response, but much more urgent is the 
need for empowerment of citizens. Removing the fixation on control of chaos, 
and replacing it with collaboration, can give both emergency managers and 
citizens the flexibility they need to respond to disastrous situations. 
It is worth noting that, although the command-and control response model 
is pervasive throughout the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and 
its national Incident Command System (ICS) component, nowhere is it quite so 
tangible as military-based state EMAs; no other military organizations are in 
command of disaster response at the federal or local levels.  
McLoughlin (1985) asserted that state level organizations have additional 
responsibilities [to those at the local emergency management-level] in that they 
must assess the emergency management needs of, and provide leadership and 
guidance for, their political subdivisions. The example of the failed tsunami debris 
planning effort cited above supports this assertion. In that case, the planning 
effort required the involvement of seven counties, multiple municipalities and 
several tribes, as well as many volunteer and private sector organizations. Only 
state-level planning can assure that all relevant stakeholders are taken into 
account and only collaboration with those stakeholders can assure that every 
voice is heard in creating workable and effective plans. 
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Dennis Wenger (2003) expressed concern about the “goodness of fit” 
between emergency management effectiveness and current command-and-
control-based models. He notes that the command-and-control approach 
illustrated by the nationally-promulgated Incident Command System (ICS), 
contrasts with the environment that emergency managers typical work in, which 
requires both flexibility and mutually agreeable outcomes. (Wenger 2003)  Dynes 
(1994) detailed how the culture of military and civil defense has deeply 
embedded erroneous, battle-metaphor, command-and-control assumptions into 
the way we think about “emergencies” and emergency management. Dynes 
(1994) asserts that the growth of the military-based emergency management 
models was based on the false assumption that citizens did not possess the 
capabilities needed to help themselves or each other in disasters. The premises 
of these two authors are supported by recent work, such as the 2007 FEMA 
Emergency Management Institute Principles of Emergency Management, 
defining essential responsibilities of emergency management functions and 
organizations. Coordination, cooperation, collaboration, and continuity are the 
mutually-agreed thematic bases for how functions should be structured and 
managed. (FEMA EMI 2007)  Additionally, the first step in preparedness planning 
at any level is the creation of a collaborative planning team that involves relevant 
stakeholders. (FEMA CPG 101 v2.0, 2010) 
Quarantelli (2008) agrees with Dynes (1994) and Wenger (2003) that the 
command and control model which has been dominant in American society is a 
model mismatched to the needs of citizens and the requirements of emergency 
management organizations. (Quarantelli 2008)  The work of other sociologists, 
most notably Mileti (2012), concurs with this view. Mileti’s studies on citizen 
behavior in disasters—particularly how citizens react to public disaster warnings 
and alerts—supports the view that citizens do not need to be “controlled” before, 
during or after disasters. (Mileti 2012) 
This body of work supports the concept of resilience to disasters. 
“Resilience” has replaced “resistant” in the emergency management lingo in 
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recognition that citizens cannot “resist” a disaster, since disasters occur 
regardless of citizen capabilities or preparedness, but they can take steps to be 
more “resilient” in returning to a level of normalcy faster/easier/better after 
disasters occur. This is meaningful to note because emergency managers at all 
governance levels are grappling with how to measure resilience, and more 
specifically how to measure the increase in resilience intended by the spending 
of tax dollars devoted to this purpose. Federal funding of projects to increase 
community resilience cuts to the heart of emergency management organization 
and staffing. 
Dyne (2000) perceives a shifting trend from emergency management’s 
historical preoccupation with providing external assistance toward an increased 
appreciation of the value of developing the capacities of families. This reflects his 
belief that recognizing the capabilities of, and supporting, existing social units—
families, community organizations and related social structures—should be the 
primary focus of emergency management planning rather than command and 
control. Remarkably, his words are echoed in the “Whole Community Approach” 
described in the recently issued FEMA Strategic Plan 2011-2014, a document 
promulgated by President Obama’s May 2010 National Security Strategy. FEMA 
now recognizes that “…it takes all aspects of a community (volunteer, faith and 
community-based organizations, the private sector, and the public, including the 
survivors themselves)—not just the government—to effectively prepare for, 
protection against, respond to, recover from and mitigate against any disaster.” 
(p8)  But FEMA goes further than Dynes to say that emergency management is a 
“continuum” that includes not just the essential functions of managing the 
impacts of disasters but also “activities that focus on the development, health and 
long-term success of those communities.” (8)   This long-coming shift in 
acknowledging where emergency managers should focus their efforts, and shape 
their functions accordingly, should have a groundbreaking effect on state and 
local emergency management organizations. 
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Kasapoglu, Mileti and Deflem (2008) researched the impact of inter-
organizational and intra-organizational structures and cultures on response to 
disasters, attempting to find a model or models that would serve as a predictor 
for response to the 9/11 attacks. This work is cited here for its usefulness to the 
research question—not for common agreement in a body of similar work, 
because no other relevant research work can be found on this specific topic. 
2.6 STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY STRUCTURES 
Bolman and Deal (2008) assert that there is no perfect structural model for 
an organization, and that the structure must enable the organization to meet its 
mission and goals. They looked at organizational effectiveness in terms of 
frameworks for structure (organization of groups and teams); human resources 
(building effective individual and group dynamics); political (managing internal 
and external power and conflict; and symbolic (shaping a culture to give meaning 
to an organization’s work). Bolman and Deal argue that an organization can be 
looked at through each of these angles for insights into how to improve the 
effectiveness of the organization to meet its mission and goals.  Structure is only 
one framework from which to view an organization. From the state EMA 
perspective, it is a framework that has been largely unexplored in research 
literature. 
Hillyard (2000) examined inter-organizational networks of crisis response 
organizations and concluded that state EMAs following FEMA’s recommended 
emergency management model worked well within the response network but 
offered no further perspective on state EMA organizational structure. 
Schumacher (2008) noted that [state] emergency management organizations do 
not command or control response and recovery operations; they merely support 
the response and recovery efforts of municipal authorities. Schumacher (2008) 
claimed that weak [state] emergency management structures increase 
vulnerability to disasters, and that vulnerability analyses should be conducted of 
emergency management organizations to prioritize hazards. 
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Woodbury (2004) claimed that how states organize and deploy their 
homeland security resources would determine “national and even international 
victory” in the war in terror. (49)  Smith (2007) examined five different models of 
combined homeland security and emergency management functions at the state 
level, concluding that a state EMA should be part of an overall homeland security 
agency reporting to the governor. 
2.6.1 Overview of Existing Structures 
Due to wide differences in state organizational and political structures, a 
scan of state emergency management websites does not reveal much about how 
state EMAs go about their business. Even a review of state comprehensive 
planning documents, when they can be located, assists little in understanding 
what state EMA organizations have in common. The National Emergency 
Management Agency (NEMA) website (2012) may be the best source of such 
information, but since that site’s purpose is a resource for state EMA directors, 
the information available for research is limited. 
State EMAs are organized generally around a set of core functions: 
comprehensive emergency management planning; training and exercise program 
management; public education and warning; hazard mitigation; maintenance of 
an emergency operations coordination center; and disaster response and 
recovery. Many of these functions are dictated by the requirements of the federal 
grants that fund the activities needed to perform the functions. The extent to 
which a state EMA devotes resources to a function is not dictated by federal 
funding; states are entirely free to decide how much of their budgets will be 
devoted to emergency management activities. Depending on how the agency 
mission is defined, grants program management, volunteer programs and 
counterterrorism activities may also be in the mix. 
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State EMAs fall into broad organizational categories. States self-identify 
their EMA organizational structures in a survey collected every two years by 
NEMA, and the published results of the survey on NEMA’s website are the only 
known source of this data.  
Nineteen states, or 38% of state EMAs, organize their functions within 
state military departments, while the remaining state EMAs are organized within 
civilian-based public safety, homeland security, state police or governor’s offices. 
Based on a review of the NEMA data as well as a scan of the fifty states’ 
individual websites, no commonality can be discerned among the geography, 
history, commerce, population make-up, natural hazards risk or international 
borders contained within any of the individual groupings to explain why state 
EMAs are structured within military or civilian departments.  
2.6.2 Military-Based Structures 
Nineteen state EMAs (38%) fall within their military (National Guard) 
departments under the direction of an adjutant general. This military-based 
organizational structure of emergency management functions, representing the 
largest grouping of state EMA structures, does not occur at any other level of 
government. The nineteen states that currently organize their EMAs within 
military departments are: Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, Wyoming (not part of NEMA 
2012 self-identification survey), Wisconsin. (NEMA 2012) 
2.6.3 Civilian-Based Structures 
The remaining state EMAs are organized within civilian agencies. (NEMA, 
2012)  Twelve EMAs (24%) are within public safety departments: Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, South 
Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Vermont and West Virginia. Nine EMAs (18%) are within 
combined homeland security or state law enforcement departments: California, 
Connecticut, Delaware (not part of NEMA 2012 self-identification survey; data 
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gleaned from Delaware EMA website), Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York and Texas. Eight EMAs (16%) are within governors’ offices: 
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma and 
Pennsylvania. Two EMAs (4%) do not fit any of these other structural categories: 
Alabama, Colorado. 
2.7 LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY 
Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8: National Preparedness ushered in a 
new focus on emergency management and homeland security core capabilities 
from a national perspective. Individual strategies aimed at pieces of our 
homeland security infrastructure and “target” capabilities are now outdated and 
superseded. Cohesive national frameworks for prevention, protection, mitigation, 
response and recovery, along with a core capabilities inventory for each of the 
five phases,  support a National Preparedness Goal and comprise a National 
Preparedness System that focuses on the needs—and the resources—of the 
whole community. The need for collaboration crosses all core capabilities and 
requires that each partner in the emergency management network assess its 
collaborative capacity. 
Increased understanding of the activities needed for prevention of terrorist 
acts places new emphasis on outcomes “Left of Boom.”  (See Figure 2)  
Prevention entails not just the sharing of information between relevant 
stakeholders, it means working with communities to understand and defuse the 
radicalization that often leads to extreme violent acts. Collaboration built on 
mutual respect and trust is an absolute requirement for prevention core 
capabilities. 
Federal future visioning projects such as the FEMA SFI demonstrate 
collaboration among national emergency management stakeholders in agreeing 
on a shared vision of the future. The FEMA SFI also lights the path to where the 
emergency management discipline is heading, and the collective outcomes and 
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emerging skills needed to create those outcomes. The SFI is in itself an example 
of the collaboration skills we need to develop as a nation. 
The National Preparedness Goal, National Preparedness System and 
FEMA SFI call for collaboration among the whole community of stakeholders in 
securing and protecting our nation from harm. In particular, collaborating to 
understand the needs and the strengths of the private sector, diverse 
communities and volunteers will be essential. Understanding and exploring the 
power of social capital and social media will be integral to meeting each of the 
national core capabilities.  
The key to meeting core capabilities is collaboration. Collaborative 
capacity in organizations must be defined, fostered, nurtured, trained, valued and 
measured. A framework for assessing collaborative capacity in organizations was 
developed by Hocevar, Fann, Thomas and Jansen (2006). This framework has 
been successful in determining collaborative capacity in national defense 
organizations. 
State EMAs must take a leadership role in collaboration among 
stakeholders. State EMA functions are structured differently from state to state, 
not only from one to another, but also from one broad structural category to 
another. A major difference in structural organization is state EMAs within military 
departments versus civilian departments. Disparate structures in state EMA 
functions may impact state EMA collaborative capability by enabling or disabling 
strategic and operational actions for collaboration, use of new technologies and 
social media, building social capital and public-private partnerships, and effective 
use of volunteers in emergency management. 
This research, then, focuses on those five areas of emerging needs: 
strategic and operational actions for collaboration; use of new technologies and 
social media; building social capital and public-private partnerships; and effective  
 
 
  47 
use of volunteers in emergency management. The next chapter describes the 
methodology used to develop and implement a survey to assess actions taken by 
state EMA organizations to build collaborative capacity in these areas. 
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3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes how the research was designed, how the research 
instrument was developed, and how the study participants were selected. It also 
describes how the study was conducted and how the data were analyzed.  
3.1 OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY 
To attempt an answer to the research questions, state EMAs were 
surveyed using an instrument derived from the literature defining the emerging 
needs of the emergency management discipline, and the specific collaboration 
actions needed to meet those needs. The survey questions were also informed 
by an instrument for assessing collaborative capacity developed in 2006 by 
Hocevar, Thomas and Jansen.  This instrument was chosen for its successful 
use in prior research and its relevance to government organizations with 
missions similar to state EMAs. 
The survey was web-based and anonymous to allow for maximum 
freedom of expression in response. This methodology was selected primarily for 
its facility in reaching a maximum number of participants. The target audience for 
this study was professional emergency management staff working in the defined 
state EMA of each of the fifty states in the U.S. The survey was designed to 
identify only the broad organizational structure of each respondent’s state 
emergency management agency. Respondent identities and home states were 
specifically not requested in order for the participants to feel comfortable and free 
in responding to questions that might otherwise cause discomfort for potentially 
expressing negative opinions about their employing organization. Only three of 
the fifty questions asked were open-ended questions, and any specific agency 
identifiers offered in those responses were redacted before the results were 
downloaded and analyzed. No demographic or personal characteristics 
questions were collected.  
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The anonymous survey methodology was selected for this study for 
several reasons. First, an almost complete lack of previous research in the area 
of state emergency management agency collaborative capacity presented no 
opportunities for analyzing previously collected data.  Second, it was thought that 
interviewing subjects on their opinions as to how their individual agencies were 
faring in meeting the identified emerging needs of the discipline, might generate 
unreliable data. Third, by using a survey rather than interviews, a broader sample 
could be reached thus increasing the generalizability of the findings. Fourth, the 
sheer range of different organizational state emergency management and 
homeland security models in existence meant that case studies or comparative 
analyses could cover only a fraction of current capacities. And finally, the 
opportunity to communicate directly with emergency management staff in all fifty 
states was irresistible. The resulting extraordinary rate of response to the survey 
offered proof that the correct methodology was chosen. 
3.2 SURVEY PARTICIPANTS 
The target group for this research was professional emergency 
management staff members in state EMAs. Valid email contact addresses for 
staff members were gleaned from publically available websites and search 
engines. Staff listed on state EMA websites who were clearly and singly 
administrative, financial or legal were excluded in order to focus on professional 
emergency managers. Professional emergency managers basically perform the 
functions of emergency planning, training and exercising; disaster response and 
recovery operations; hazard mitigation; public information and awareness; grants 
administration; and maintenance of communications and online information-
sharing resources. Some organizations include volunteer management, 
homeland security functions, public-private partnership offices and enhanced 
information technology departments. (Please see Appendix F for a look at 
apparent functions of state EMAs as evidenced by their websites.) 
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Email addresses for approximately 600 state EMA staff members were 
collected and used for the survey invitation email. Error messages returned from 
outdated addresses brought the valid email address count to 580. Addresses 
were available for all fifty states. An average of ten to fifteen addresses were 
found for each state. State geographic and population size were not found to be 
indicators of EMA staff size or the availability of EMA staff contact info.  
Each state EMA was sent one email message with all addresses visible in 
the “To” section of the message. The message encouraged sharing the survey 
opportunity with others in the organization in order to maximize participation 
among those who may not have received the survey invitation. (Please see 
Appendix A for the full text of the email invitation to participate.)  
One email message, identical to that sent to state EMA staff, was also 
sent through the UASI listserv for its wide readership among state and urban 
area emergency management throughout the U.S. The email emphasized that 
the survey was applicable only to state EMA staff. This mechanism for survey 
distribution was used primarily to reinforce the direct emails sent to state 
agencies, to add further credibility to the research and attempt to influence 
targeted state EMA decisions in taking the time and effort to respond. 
The methodology used for the survey invitation resulted in 168 usable 
responses4, a response rate of thirty percent. Responses were received from 
each state EMA organizational structure type sufficient to draw conclusions about 
the relationship of survey data to structure type. The percentages of responses 
by organizational structure category were relatively closely correlated to the 
percentages of actual organizational structures among state EMAs. For example, 
the number of state EMAs within military departments is 18, or 36% of the total 
                                                 
4 From 175 participant responses, three were self-identified as belonging to county EMAs 
rather than state-level EMAs and were thus removed from data analysis.  One response was 
removed due to insufficient questions answered.  Three responses of “I don’t know how my 
agency is structured” were also removed, since one focus of the research questions was the 
collaborative capacity by agency organizational structures.  The remaining total of 168 responses 
was used for data analysis. 
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state EMAs. The number of survey responses from military-based state EMAs 
was 64, or 37% of the total responses. This suggests that the sample is 
representative of the population and increases the generalizability of the findings 
presented in Chapter 4, Data and Analysis. 
Table 1 shows the final grouping of responses, by structural organization 
category, used for the data analysis. Also shown is a comparison of the number 
or responses by organizational structure to the number of state EMAs with each 
structure. 
Table 1.   State EMAs and Survey Responses by Organizational 
Structure with Responses of “Other” Recategorized 
 




















Office of the 
Governor 
9 18% 58 35% 
Public Safety 
Department 
12 24% 40 24% 
Homeland 
Security/      
State Police 
10 20% 6 4% 
Military 
Department 
19 38% 64 37% 
Total 50 100% 168 100% 
Note:  This table shows the total state EMAs by organizational structure category and compares it to the 
total survey responses by category. Eight responses of “Other” were discerned from the comment box text 
and moved into the organizational structure they most closely resembled. Correspondingly, the two states 
with self-identified (NEMA 2012) organizational structures of “Other” were also grouped with the 
categories they most closely resembled in order to simplify the chart. 
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This final grouping of responses in this table demonstrates even further 
that the majority of state EMA organizational structures were well represented in 
the survey response. Military-based state EMA organizations had the highest 
rate of response to the survey. Homeland security/state police-based state EMA 
organizations had the lowest rate of response; nevertheless, enough responses 
were received from this—the smallest of the four broad-based categories—to 
ensure adequate representation. 
3.3 SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Survey questions were constructed using an instrument developed and 
refined by Jansen, Hocevar, Rendon and Thomas (2009) to gauge organizational 
capacity for collaboration in homeland security-related organizations. The 
instrument uses a framework that looks at factors in the categories of purpose 
and strategy for collaboration; structure for collaboration; lateral mechanisms and 
processes for collaboration; incentives and reward systems for collaboration; and 
the people aspects of collaboration. Using this framework, and current FEMA 
literature describing emerging needs of the emergency management discipline, 
in particular the FEMA SFI and vision documents, fifty questions were outlined to 
determine:  
• general value placed on collaboration in an organization; 
• support for forging relationships with diverse communities; 
• support for solicitation and utilization of volunteers; 
• support for partnering with the private sector; 
• support for development of organizational social capital; and  
• support for use and development of social media and technology 
tools for collaboration.  
All questions except the three open-ended questions were phrased in the 
form of positive statements to which the participants responded using a 6-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1=Strongly Disagree to 6=Strongly Agree. No other 
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descriptors or qualifiers were added to the scale. [Complete text and sequence of 
survey questions can be found in Appendix A.]  
The survey began with a question requesting consent to participate (Q1), 
three questions to determine the staff size, organization structure and history of 
structure change (Q2-4), including an open-ended question to explain the reason 
for structural change if known. The structure question asked respondents to 
identify the overall reporting structure of the state EMA; in other words, did the 
organization report to a governor’s office, public safety department, military 
department, homeland security/state police department, or “other.”  If “other” was 
selected, a comment box was provided for describing the reporting structure. An 
option of “I don’t know how my agency is structured” was also provided. 
The purpose of this first survey section was to establish the general 
organizational framework in which respondents were employed. Collecting this 
data enabled analysis of responses by structural organization, to determine if 
agency structure made a difference in the response to questions. Responses to 
the questions regarding size of agency and history of structural change were 
found to have little value in the analysis. 
Strategic and Operational Factors for Collaboration 
This set of questions focused on the extent to which collaboration is 
valued, strategized, trained, or otherwise institutionalized within the state EMA 
organization’s policies and practices. Each of the questions was phrased as a 
statement to which the respondent could select “Strongly Agree” (6), Strongly 
Disagree” (1), or one of four points in the range between the two. 
A definition of collaboration was provided: “state emergency management 
agencies working with other organizations to achieve common goals. Other 
organizations may include: other state agencies; neighboring state governments; 
DHS and FEMA program offices; FEMA regional administration; local and tribal 
governments and responders; state and local boards and commissions; 
emergency management professional/advocacy organizations; federal and state 
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congressional representatives; educational institutions; nongovernmental 
organizations; federal law enforcement; faith-based and other community 
organizations; and private sector organizations, to name a few.”   Fourteen 
questions (Q5-18) followed. 
Six questions examined strategic factors for collaboration: 
There is agreement within my organization about the purpose and value of 
inter-organizational collaboration. (Question 5) 
 
• The success of my organization's mission requires collaborating 
effectively with other organizations. (Question 6) 
 
• My agency has clearly established goals for inter-organizational 
collaboration. (Question 7) 
 
• My agency always seeks a mutually beneficial solution when 
negotiating agreements with other organizations.  (Question 11) 
 
• The people in my agency show respect for differing points of view 
in other organizations. (Question 13) 
 
• My agency collaborates with other organizations even when there 
are no financial/funding incentives. (Question 14) 
 
The remaining eight questions focused on operational factors for 
collaboration. 
 
• My agency takes a lead role in forming inter-organizational teams 
for preparedness planning and prevention. (Question 8) 
 
• My agency’s policies emphasize relationship building with other 
organizations. (Question 9) 
 
• My agency makes training available in relationship-building skills. 
(Question 10) 
 
• My agency has established protocols for sharing resources with 
other organizations. (Question 12) 
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• My organization's leaders regularly meet and confer with the 
leaders of other organizations about mutual collaboration. 
(Question 15) 
 
• My agency works with other organizations to build a shared vision 
of future emergency management challenges. (Question 16) 
 
• When recruiting new staff, my agency clearly values collaboration 
skills.  (Question 17) 
 
• When promoting staff, my agency clearly values collaboration skills. 
(Question 18) 
 
Relationship Building with Diverse Communities 
The next set of questions centered on organizational support for 
relationship building with diverse communities. A definition of diverse 
communities was provided: “…can mean not only communities that are 
geographically determined, but also to groups that have common interests or 
concerns related to emergency management (e.g., nationalities, religious beliefs, 
languages, economic situations, special physical needs or mental needs).”  Five 
questions (Q19-23) followed, to determine the extent to which participants felt 
their agencies valued relationship building with local communities and/or had put 
relevant policies or practices into place. 
 
• My agency’s policies emphasize relationship building with local 
communities. (Question 19) 
 
• My agency has developed relationships with local communities, to 
work together to build community resilience to disasters. (Question 
20) 
 
• My agency works with local communities to implement efforts to 
prevent radicalization, especially of youth, that often leads to violent 
acts. (Question 21) 
 
• When recruiting new staff, my agency clearly values expertise in 
relationship building with local communities. (Question 22) 
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• When promoting staff, my agency clearly values expertise in 
relationship building with local communities. (Question 23) 
 
Soliciting and Utilizing Volunteers 
Six questions (Q24-29) followed, to determine the extent to which 
participants felt their agencies valued volunteers, whether volunteer input was 
solicited and valued, and whether volunteer management skills were valued 
and/or trained in the organization. 
 
• My agency has clearly established goals for soliciting, training and 
utilizing volunteers. (Question 24) 
 
• My agency solicits input from volunteers and uses that input to 
shape its volunteer program. (Question 25) 
 
• My agency has protocols in place for credentialing volunteers for 
disaster response. (Question 26) 
 
• My agency provides training in volunteer management to agency 
staff. (Question 27) 
 
• When recruiting new staff, my agency clearly values expertise in 
soliciting and utilizing volunteers. (Question 28) 
 
• When promoting staff, my agency clearly values expertise in 
soliciting and utilizing volunteers. (Question 29) 
 
Developing and Using Social Media and Networks 
The next set of questions centered on social media tools and networks. A 
definition of social media was provided: “…social connection websites such as 
Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, etc., and the corresponding “apps” that allow instant 
two-way communications via websites, smartphones and other technologies.” 
Seven questions (Q30-36) followed, to determine the extent to which participants 
felt their agencies actively encouraged, used and/or trained social media tools 
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and technologies. An eighth, open-ended question (Q37) asked for an example 
of a social media best practice from the participant’s organization. 
 
• My agency uses social media tools and networks to communicate 
with local communities. (Question 30) 
 
• My agency makes information about volunteer opportunities for 
emergency management work available through websites or social 
media sites. (Question 31) 
 
• My agency provides training in social media technologies for staff to 
use in collaborating with other organizations. (Question 32) 
 
• My agency works with other organizations to develop new “apps” 
for emergency preparedness planning and crisis management. 
(Question 33) 
 
• My agency devotes resources (money and time) for learning about 
emerging social media technologies potentially useful to emergency 
preparedness planning and crisis management. (Question 34) 
 
• When recruiting new staff, my agency clearly values expertise in 
social media and other technologies useful to emergency 
preparedness planning and crisis management. (Question 35) 
 
• When promoting staff, my agency clearly values expertise in social 
media and other technologies useful to emergency preparedness 
planning and crisis management. (Question 36) 
 




Private Sector Collaboration 
Eight questions (Q38-45) followed, to determine the extent to which 
participants felt their agencies practiced private sector collaboration, whether 
their agencies were actively involved in private sector partnerships and whether 
training was provided in private sector partnering. 
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• My agency has agreements in place with private sector 
organizations to share responsibilities in disasters. (Question 38) 
 
• My agency takes the needs and capabilities of private sector 
organizations into account in disaster management planning. 
(Question 39) 
 
• My agency collaborates with private sector organizations on cyber 
security issues. (Question 40) 
 
• My agency collaborates with private sector organizations on critical 
infrastructure protection issues. (Question 41) 
 
• My agency provides training in working with private sector 
organizations. (Question 42) 
 
• My agency provides training in how to protect private sector 
proprietary sensitive or information. (Question 43) 
 
• When recruiting new staff, my agency clearly values private sector 
partnering skills. (Question 44) 
 
• When promoting staff, my agency clearly values private sector 
partnering skills. (Question 45) 
 
Building Social Capital 
The last grouping of questions centered on social capital. A definition of 
social capital was provided: “the number and strength of work group, social group, 
faith/community group, family, friend, acquaintance, and professional colleague 
relationships that individuals, communities and organizations can draw upon in 
times of need.”  Four questions (Q46-49) followed, to determine the extent to 
which participants felt their agencies engaged relevant stakeholders, defined and 
agreed on collective outcomes, and had devised a method for measuring social 
capital in their organizations. 
 
• My agency has taken action to engage all relevant stakeholders in 
preparedness planning and prevention. (Question 46) 
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• My agency has worked with stakeholders to define and agree on 
collective outcomes. (Question 47) 
 
• My agency has a method for measuring mutually agreed-upon collective 
outcomes. (Question 48) 
 
• My agency has a method for measuring its "social capital.”  (Question 49) 
 
 
The final survey question (Q50) asked the open-ended question: “If there 
was one thing that could be done in your agency to improve inter-organizational 
collaboration, what would that be?” 
3.4 ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
Survey response data were extracted from the Survey Monkey tool and 
loaded into the SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) program. This 
program was used to calculate the descriptive statistics (item and scale means 
and standard deviations) for groupings of the data by organizational structure of 
respondent organizations, and to do comparisons across the groups.  
Survey responses that were unusable due to invalid (not part of target 
audience) or unidentified organizational structures, or insufficient survey answers, 
were removed from calculations.  This resulted in total of 168 usable responses. 
Because there were few respondents in the homeland security/state police 
department organizational structure (6 total), this group was excluded from the 
comparative analyses. However, all respondents were included in the total 
sample descriptive analyses. 
A critical value of p<.05 was used to determine statistical significance for 
all analyses. In addition, in order to allow for a discussion of item-level results, a 
critical mean difference was determined. Several targeted T-tests were 
conducted to determine the size of difference between two item means 
necessary to achieve the critical value of p<.05. The calculations found that if two 
items have means that differ by at least 0.2, then those means are statistically 
different (p<.05). Item-level mean differences less than 0.2 can not be claimed as 
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statistically different. Calculations were not done to compare all possible means. 
Instead, this “rule of thumb” (established using targeted T-tests) will be used in 
the presentation of findings in the next chapter.  
The Cronbach’s alpha test was used to determine internal consistency 
reliability for each scale. These scales are the groupings of survey questions into 
seven factors: strategic action for building collaboration; operational aspects of 
collaboration; collaborating with local communities; working with volunteers; 
using social media; working with the private sector; and building social capital. In 
the Cronbach’s alpha test, any value higher than a .7 is considered statistically 
reliable for social science research. The reliabilities of scales used in this 
research ranged from .89 to .94, showing strong internal consistency reliability. 
Scale and item-level findings are presented in the next chapter.   
3.5 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
There are several limitations to consider when reviewing the methodology 
of this research. First, other than fact-based questions relating to respondent 
organization size and structure, all of the questions are entirely subjective. 
Responses are based on participant perceptions about their individual 
organizations, not on what may be factually occurring in those organizations. 
Questions were sent to professional state EMA staff at all levels in each 
organization, and the responses of a lower-level staff member may differ greatly 
from those of a director or manager. Also, the questions cross disciplines within 
state EMA organizations; if an organization is “stove-piped” internally, a 
participant in one section may not really know what is happening in another 
section. In the same vein, a lack of vertical information flow in an organization 
can impact perceptions; lower-level staff members may not have a view into what 
executive management is doing. That said, participants were not required to 
answer all questions, as the survey allowed them to skip questions they could not 
or did not want to answer. 
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A second limitation is that the anonymity of the survey allowed for no 
insight into which or how many states responded. Finally, the survey seeks solely 
to determine whether different structural organizations of state EMAs have an 
impact on their ability to meet emerging demands of the emergency management 
discipline. For any differences discovered, the Researcher can offer only 
speculation as to the reasons for differences. Further research will be needed to 
ascertain reasons for differences in how different state EMAs structures are 
faring in collaborative capacity. 
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4.0 DATA AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter describes overall results of the survey, data collected, and 
analysis of findings. It begins with a presentation of the overall pattern of findings 
for the total sample. This is followed by a comparison of results for military-based 
vs. civilian-based agencies. 
4.1 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OVERVIEW 
This section describes the results of statistical tests used to analyze and 
compare the survey response data. (For more information about the analysis 
methodology, see Section 3.4 of this thesis.)  The data were analyzed using the 
seven collaboration factors:  
 
1) strategic actions for collaboration; 
2) operational actions for collaboration; 
3) collaboration with local/diverse communities; 
4) building social capital; 
5) collaboration with the private sector; 
6) collaboration with volunteers; 
7) using social media and networks. 
 
Item and scale means and standard deviations were calculated.  (The 
mean and standard deviation for each of the Likert-scaled survey questions can 
be found in Appendix C.)  
Table 2 illustrates the Cronbach alpha reliability of the seven collaboration 
factors, along with the mean and standard deviation.  
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Strategic action for collaboration .92 4.8 1.1 
Operational action for collaboration .93 4.1 1.2 
Collaboration with local/diverse communities .89 3.9 1.2 
Building social capital .91 3.6 1.3 
Collaboration with private sector .93 3.6 1.3 
Collaboration with volunteers .94 3.3 1.4 
Use of social media and networks .93 3.2 1.4 
Note:  Ratings based on scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree, to 6 = Strongly Agree. Alpha = Cronbach alpha 
reliability. 
 
This table demonstrates the overall collaborative capacity of state EMAs 
across the U.S. As a nation, our strongest collaborative capacity at the state 
EMA level is that we recognize the importance and the need for collaboration and 
have taken strategic action for it. 
Beyond strategic action, however, state EMAs are not taking actions 
needed to operationalize or institutionalize collaboration. The difference in means, 
between 4.8 for strategic action and 4.1 for operational action, is significant. The 
rest of the mean values tell the same story.  The next five specific aspects of 
collaboration are all rated below 4.0 on a 6-point scale. Among these five, 
collaboration with diverse communities has the highest rating (3.9), compared 
with use of social media (3.2) and collaboration with volunteers (3.3), which have 
the lowest ratings. Collaboration with the private sector and building social capital 
both have a mean rating of 3.6, which is statistically lower than collaboration with 
diverse communities, but higher than the two lowest rated factors. 
By their own self-report, these data show that state EMAs are not taking 
adequate action to meet the collaboration needs of the emergency management 
discipline. The lowest mean value of 3.2 for social media is particularly telling. 
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Literature describing the powerful growth of social media across all communities, 
and its usefulness to the core capability mission areas of disaster prevention, 
protection, mitigation, response and recovery, has proliferated in the past few 
years. Gusty (2011) discusses the use of social media in public alert and warning, 
a core capability common to all five mission areas. Peters (2012) offers that 
social media can be used to significantly strengthen the prevention mission area 
of suspicious activity reporting.  Lucus-McEwen (2012) describes the recent 
growth of technical volunteerism, defined as groups of geospatial information 
systems, social media and information technology experts now known as VTCs 
(volunteer technical communities), that have taken the initiative to further disaster 
response and recovery technologies on their own. Lack of state EMA capabilities 
in the area of social media may be hindering progress in other collaboration 
areas, since social media can be used to work more closely with local 
communities, volunteers and private sector organizations. 
A complete table showing the means and standard deviations of the 
survey questions, organized by the seven factors of collaboration, can be found 
in Appendix D. This table allows us to delve more deeply into the specific actions 
needed to develop collaborative capacity in state EMAs and how we are doing as 
a nation in taking those actions. Overall, the individual question mean values in 
this table serve to reinforce observations made above regarding the status of 
state EMAs on the seven collaboration factors investigated in this research. A 
closer look at individual items reveals more detail to strengthen this national 
picture of state EMA collaborative capacity. 
The analysis that follows in the next section discusses each of the seven 
collaboration factors separately.  
4.2 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SEVEN COLLABORATION FACTORS 
In this section, tables showing the mean and standard deviation for each 
of the seven collaboration factors are followed by analysis of the results. (The 
entire table of survey questions by collaboration factor can be found in Appendix 
C for reference.) 
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Table 3.   Item-Level Means – Strategic Action for Collaboration 
Scale Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Strategic action for collaboration 4.8 1.1 
Success of our mission requires collaboration (Q6) 5.7 0.9 
Agree on purpose, value of inter-organizational collaboration (Q5) 4.9 1.3 
We collaborate even when there are no financial incentives (Q14) 4.9 1.3 
Seeks mutually beneficial solutions in negotiating agreements (Q11) 4.4 1.3 
Clearly established goals for inter-organizational collaboration (Q7) 4.4 1.4 
People show respect for differing points of view in other orgs (Q13) 4.2 1.4 
Note:  Ratings based on scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree, to 6 = Strongly Agree.  
 
As shown in Table 3, the strategic action item with the highest rating (5.7) 
is recognition of the strategic value of collaboration. Then, a significant drop 
occurs in the ratings of other strategic items, such as having goals for inter-
agency collaboration (4.4) and respect for different points of view in other 
organizations (4.2). This suggests that collaboration is viewed as an ideal, but 
may be difficult for state EMAs to incorporate into strategic actions that would 
build organizational collaborative capacity. 
Table 4.   Item-Level Means – Operational Action for Collaboration 
Scale Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Operational action for collaboration 4.1 1.2 
Agency takes lead role in forming inter-organizational teams (Q8) 4.7 1.3 
Policies emphasize relationship building w/other organizations 
(Q9) 
4.5 1.5 
Agency has established protocols for sharing resources (Q12) 4.5 1.4 
Leaders regularly meet w/other org leaders to collaborate (Q15) 4.4 1.3 
Builds shared vision of future emergency management challenges 
(Q16) 
4.3 1.5 
When recruiting, agency values collaboration skills (Q17) 3.9 1.5 
When promoting, agency values collaboration skills (Q18) 3.7 1.5 
Agency provides training in relationship building skills (Q10) 3.7 1.6 
Note:  Ratings based on scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree, to 6 = Strongly Agree.  
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Table 4 shows the highest item rating in agencies taking a lead role in 
forming inter-organizational teams (4.7). Policies for building relationships (4.5) 
and protocols for sharing resources have similar rankings, indicating relatively 
the same level of activity in state EMAs overall. However, a sharp drop occurs in 
the ratings of other operational items such as emphasizing the value of 
collaboration skills in recruiting practices (3.9), and providing relationship-building 
skills training to staff (3.7). Emphasizing the value of collaboration skill in 
promoting staff also received a low rating (3.7). The low ratings for these 
activities suggests that operational actions for collaboration are still confined to 
higher level in state EMA organizations and have not yet filtered down to the 
general staff level. 
Table 5.   Item-Level Means – Collaboration with Local/Diverse 
Communities 
Scale Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Collaboration with local/diverse communities 3.9 1.2 
Policies emphasize relationship building w/local communities (Q19) 4.7 1.4 
Agency has developed relationships with local communities (Q20) 4.6 1.3 
When recruiting, agency values local community relation skills (Q22) 3.8 1.6 
When promoting, agency values local community relation skills (Q23) 3.7 1.5 
Works w/local communities to prevent radicalization/violence (Q21) 2.6 1.4 
Note:  Ratings based on scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree, to 6 = Strongly Agree.  
 
As shown in Table 5, the mean value of 2.6 response to the question 
regarding actions to prevent radicalization that often leads to extreme violent acts 
(Q21) demonstrated that most state EMAs are not working on this type of 
collaboration. This is an unsurprising response for two possible reasons. First, 
this question was worded with a more specific result than other questions that 
were more generally about building collaborative capacity among organizations 
and between partners. Second, this question has to do with the prevention 
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capability area, which up until the recent advent of PPD-8 and the NPG has been 
mostly the province of law enforcement agencies.  The NPG (FEMA, 2011) and 
related national strategies, along with the FEMA SFI and visioning documents, 
clearly place prevention as a core capability area for all organizations in the 
emergency preparedness network. The low score on this survey question is likely 
not unique to state EMAs but is a capability target for federal and local EMAs as 
well. Moving “left of boom” (Lawrenson Smith LLC) as illustrated in Section 2.2, 
Figure 2, requires traditionally response-oriented EMAs to learn new skills to 
prevent extreme acts of violence by both terrorist and “lone-wolf” actors on 
American soil. As such, federal, state, local and tribal EMAs will need to 
collaborate closely to learn from law enforcement and from local communities the 
actions needed to spot radicalized behaviors and develop prevention capabilities. 
Other rankings in Table 5 reveal a sharp disparity between organizational 
policy (4.7) and practice (4.6) for relationship building with local communities, 
and the valuing of these skills in the staff recruiting (3.8) and promotional (3.7) 
processes. As with operational actions for collaboration in Table 4, the Table 5 
rankings suggest that state EMA policy and practice emphasizing collaboration 
skills is not occurring in the strategic/structural element of staff recruitment, or the 
incentives/rewards element of promoting staff.  
Table 6.   Item-Level Means – Building Social Capital 
Scale Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Building social capital 3.6 1.3 
Engages relevant sectors in emergency preparedness planning (Q46) 4.3 1.3 
Works w/stakeholders to define & agree on collective outcomes (Q47) 4.1 1.4 
Agency has developed method to measure collective outcomes (Q48) 3.4 1.5 
Agency has method for measuring social capital (Q49) 2.7 1.5 
Note:  Ratings based on scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree, to 6 = Strongly Agree.  
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Table 6 above and Table 7 below show that the collaboration factors of 
building social capital, and private sector collaboration, have the same overall 
ranking of 3.6. This indicates both factors are occurring in state EMAs at a similar 
level of activity. However, the mean rating for whether state EMAs have attained 
a method of measuring social capital (2.7) was the second to lowest item ranking 
in the survey. This suggests that, although planning and other activities are 
occurring in state EMAs for building social capital, at least to some extent, lack of 
a measurement definition may be hindering the incorporation of social capital into 
other strategic and operational actions that would strengthen and enhance it. 
Table 7.   Item-Level Means – Collaboration with the Private Sector 
Scale Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Collaboration with private sector 3.6 1.3 
Collaborates w/private sector on critical infrastructure issues (Q41) 4.3 1.5 
Accounts for private sector needs, capabilities in disaster plans (Q39) 4.2 1.4 
Agreements in place w/private sector to share responsibilities (Q38) 4.0 1.6 
Agency provides training in working w/private sector (Q42) 3.8 1.6 
Collaborates with private sector on cyber security issues (Q40) 3.3 1.5 
When recruiting, agency values private sector partnering skills (Q44) 3.3 1.5 
When promoting, agency values private sector partnering skills (Q45) 3.2 1.5 
Agency provides training in private sector proprietary info (Q43) 3.1 1.6 
Note:  Ratings based on scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree, to 6 = Strongly Agree.  
 
Table 7 rankings echo the rankings of Table 4 and Table 5 with regard to 
staff recruitment and promotional activities. This indicates that collaboration with 
the private sector is occurring, but falling short in organizational activities that 
build staff skills. Further demonstrating this, the training provided to staff in 
handling private sector proprietary information received the lowest ranking (3.1) 
in this collaboration factor. The rankings above 4.0, for collaboration with the 
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private sector on critical infrastructure issues, show mild agreement that these 
activities are occurring in state EMAs. 
Table 8.   Item-Level Means – Collaboration with Volunteers 
Scale Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Collaboration with volunteers 3.3 1.4 
Clearly established goals for soliciting, training volunteers (Q24) 3.6 1.6 
Solicits input from volunteers, uses to shape volunteer program (Q25) 3.5 1.6 
Protocols in place for credentialing volunteers in disasters (Q26) 3.4 1.7 
Agency provides training in volunteer management (Q27) 3.3 1.6 
When recruiting, agency values skills in working w/volunteers (Q28) 3.0 1.5 
When promoting, agency values skills in working w/volunteers (Q29) 2.9 1.5 
Note:  Ratings based on scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree, to 6 = Strongly Agree.  
 
Table 8 echoes a theme in previously shown tables: organizational work is 
occurring in this area, but not to the level of developing staff skills to build this 
collaborative capacity. The item-level means for collaboration with volunteers are 
among the lowest in the survey response, suggesting that, overall, attention to 
building collaborative capacity with volunteers is not an emphasis of state EMAs. 
In this case, there is mild agreement that state EMAs have strategized for 
collaboration with volunteers by establishing clear goals (3.6), and have 
operationalized working with volunteers by soliciting and using volunteer input 
(3.5), and some staff training in working with volunteers (3.3) is occurring; but 
placing emphasis on these skills in the staff recruitment (3.0) and promotional 
(2.9) processes is clearly falling short.  
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Table 9.   Item-Level Means – Use of Social Media and Networks 
Scale Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Use of social media and networks     3.2 1.4 
Use social media to communicate with local communities (Q30) 4.4 1.5 
Uses social media to communicate volunteer opportunities (Q31) 3.4 1.6 
Agency devotes resources to learning about new social media (Q34) 3.1 1.6 
Works w/other organizations to develop emergency mgmt apps (Q33) 2.9 1.7 
When recruiting, agency values social media skills (Q35) 2.9 1.5 
Agency provides training in social media (Q32) 2.8 1.6 
When promoting, agency values social media skills (Q36) 2.8 1.5 
Note:  Ratings based on scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree, to 6 = Strongly Agree.  
 
Finally, Table 9 echoes the theme in earlier tables. Using social media to 
communicate with local communities received a relatively medium ranking of 4.4, 
suggesting that this activity may be starting to occur but is still a nascent activity 
in state EMAs. The rankings of all other items in this collaboration factor drop off 
sharply, indicating that there is much work to be done in this area of building 
collaborative capacity. As with Tables 4, 5, 7 and 8, staff training (2.8), 
recruitment (2.9) and promotion (2.8) processes received the lowest rankings 
within this collaboration factor, as well as some of the lowest rankings in the 
entire survey.    
4.3 OPEN-ENDED COMMENT RESPONSES    
Two open-ended comment questions were analyzed from the survey: 
 
1) Please describe a social media “best practice” from your agency 
(Q37). 
 
2) If there was one thing that could be done in your agency to improve 
inter-organizational collaboration, what would that be? (Q50). 
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Only forty-five participants (27% of the total respondents) responded to 
the social media best practice question. Responses were nearly evenly divided 
between military-based (36%), office of the governor-based (33%), and public 
safety-based (31%) organizations. (Please refer to Appendix E for complete text 
of responses to this question, organized by state EMA structural type.)  
Responses indicate that social media use in state EMAs is still too much in its 
infancy to reveal a best practice. For example, “we just started using social 
media and only use it on occasion” and “my agency is a newcomer to social 
media and just in the experimental stage” were comments indicative of the 
majority of responses across all state EMA organizational structures.  
The strongest use of social media for disaster preparedness and response 
was apparent in the comments from public safety-based organizations: two 
agencies commented that they were currently in the hiring process for dedicated 
social media staff positions. The strongest use of social media for public 
information dissemination was apparent in the comments from Office of the 
Governor-based EMAs; 47% of this group’s comments supported this. One 
comment each among public safety-based and Office of the Governor-based 
EMAs indicated their organizations restricted or prohibited use of social media; 
however, one-third of the responses in military-based EMAs indicated a 
restriction or prohibition on social media. Taken together, all of the responses 
paint a picture of undeveloped use of this collaborative capacity tool and the 
potential need to re-examine the policies related to the use of social media. 
Seventy-two participants (43% of the total respondents) responded to the 
question on one thing that could be done in the organization to improve 
collaboration.  Overall, respondent comments reinforced their answers to the 
Likert-scaled questions. The same themes were common among military-based 
and civilian-based organizations.5  A majority of comments (51%) called for more 
                                                 
5 Three respondents, however, took this opportunity to comment that their military-based 
EMA should be moved into a civilian-based organizational structure.  Two of these respondents 
designated alternate structures: one indicated the Office of the Governor, and one indicated the 
State Patrol. 
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strategic planning and/or more leadership at management levels in the 
collaborative capacity areas in this study. Many of these comments crossed both 
the strategic and operational domains of collaboration. “Develop and 
communicate a clear, measurable objective and incorporate it into everyday 
operations and have managers lead by example;” “incorporation into the strategic 
plan;” and “improve our metrics for inter-organizational collaboration” are 
samples of such comments. Fifteen comments (20%) centered around the need 
for improved staffing and training for collaboration activities.   
4.4 COMPARISON OF MILITARY-BASED VS. CIVILIAN-BASED 
AGENCIES  
Overall, the survey results present two significant findings. First, as noted 
in the previous section, the data suggest that although as a nation we are in 
complete agreement that success of our state EMA missions requires 
collaboration, we have not yet taken adequate actions to achieve the 
collaborative capacity needed to meet emerging demands of the emergency 
management discipline. When examining responses to the seven collaboration 
factors as in Table 10 below, it is noteworthy that the pattern of rankings, with 
strategic actions for collaboration at the top and use of social media at the bottom, 
was the same for both military-based and civilian-based organizations. This 
pattern of responses provides a reliable finding that we are, as a nation of state 
EMAs, recognizing that collaboration is important to our missions but not taking 
adequate actions to build collaborative capacity. 
The second research question was to investigate whether collaborative 
capacity varied depending on whether a state EMA was run from a military or 
civilian organization. The survey results show that military-based state EMAs lag 
significantly behind their civilian counterparts in the development of collaborative 
capacity. Examined by responses to the seven factors, military-based state 
EMAs showed less positive responses than civilian-based state EMAs in every 
category, as can be seen in Table 10. 
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Strategic action for building collaborative capacity                              5.0
(.9) 
4.6      
(1.1) 
* 
Operational action for building collaborative capacity 4.4     
(1.1) 
3.8      
(1.1) 
* 
Relationship building with local/diverse communities 4.2    
(1.2) 
3.5      
(1.0) 
* 
Building organizational social capital 3.9     
(1.3) 
3.3      
(1.1) 
* 
Working with and valuing the private sector 3.8    
(1.3) 
3.4      
(1.1) 
* 
Soliciting, working with and valuing volunteers 3.6    
(1.4) 
3.0      
(1.2) 
* 
Using social media tools and networks 3.3    
(1.4) 
3.0      
(1.1) 
* 
Note:  Top number is mean, bottom number is standard deviation.  * = differences in means for two groups 
are significant (p<.05) using t-test. 
 
Military-based state EMAs also stood out from their civilian counterparts in 
other aspects of the survey response. At 51% agreement to the statement “my 
agency has not changed its organizational structure,” military-based state EMAs 
were shown to have had the least changes to their organizational structures, as 
compared to 37% for offices of the governor, 17% for homeland security/state 
police departments, and 16% for public safety departments.  
Kaiser (2011) notes that there are no commonly accepted precise 
definitions of collaboration, and that “understanding and use of [collaboration] 
concepts…might differ meaningfully between the military and civilian sectors of 
government, given their different responsibilities, heritages, authority structures, 
organizational frameworks, and autonomy among the components.”  (Kaiser, 
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2011, 5)  Lack of a common concept of collaboration between military and civilian 
organizations may also indicate that staff training on collaboration, and other 
internal mechanisms that enhance the perceived value of collaboration within the 
organization, may be even more important to effect in military-based state EMAs 
than in civilian-based EMAs,  
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5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The findings of this research indicate that as a nation, we have much work 
to do at the state level in preparing to meet emerging demands of the emergency 
management discipline. The data show that we have universal recognition that 
collaboration is needed to meet these needs, but the self-report survey data 
indicates only low to moderate achievements in collaborative capacity. 
According to the presidential directives for a cohesive national 
preparedness system, and the related FEMA documents, collaboration among 
the whole community partners is a fundamental requirement.  State EMAs are 
the hub of this ecosystem and must build the skills required to lead the whole 
community partners in collaboration. Evidenced by the results of this research, it 
appears we have much work to do to build these skills. 
These actions are recommended for building overall collaborative capacity 
in state EMAs across the nation: 
 
• State EMAs should incorporate plans to meet emerging needs of 
the emergency management discipline into their strategic objectives and 
comprehensive planning documents.  
 
The mandates for omni-directional information sharing and collaboration, 
volunteer solicitation and utilization, social media and technology exploitation, 
and partnering with the whole community for resilience are clear. These 
mandates are not just clear to those of us in the field of emergency management, 
they are clear to the world. Citizens expect their governments to protect them 
from harm and to help them in times of need regardless of the size of national 
budgets or deficits. Not planning adequately, or failing to implement plans 
effectively, may subject state governments to claims of negligence.  
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FEMA offers an abundance of training and technical assistance programs for 
improving skills and growing the core capabilities of disaster prevention, 
protection, mitigation, response and recovery. States should exploit these 
offerings to the maximum, training concurrently with stakeholders whenever 
possible. 
 
• State emergency managers should develop policies that foster 
community involvement in disaster preparedness, working with local EMAs and 
responders in training community leaders to assume strong response roles in 
disasters.  
 
Performing such roles will reinforce the contribution and citizenship of 
community leaders, enhance their reputations and strengthen their roles within 
their communities. If state emergency management policies and practices 
recognize and support the roles of community leaders in disasters, the likelihood 
of future collaborations between government and communities will also be 
increased. State emergency managers should seek and develop tools to bridge 
the gap between government and individuals in ways that build trust between the 
two. 
 
• State emergency managers should develop training curricula, for 
both staff and collaboration partners, on learning the mechanisms for inter-
organizational collaboration and the use of social media and other technologies 
that enable collaboration.  
 
The widespread adoption of handheld smartphones throughout society is 
enabling communication and coordination as never before. Opportunities abound 
for harnessing social media applications and devices to support emergency 
management functions. State EMAs should take a leadership role in working with 
citizens, communities, volunteers and private sector organizations along state 
public health, social services, commerce, transportation and law enforcement 
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agencies and educational institutions to develop interconnected websites, apps 
and other technologies that are defined by the needs of the whole community 
and not just individual organizations. Working on technology applications can 
provide a platform for learning collaboration skills: it requires that stakeholders 
partner to define mutually agreeable outcomes and the resources (time and 
money) that each will provide.  
 
• State emergency managers should consider adding or emphasizing 
skills in collaboration, public-private sector partnership, social media and 
volunteer management to the skills and capabilities that are valued in state EMA 
recruiting, hiring and promotional practices.  
 
Survey results demonstrated that organizational recruitment and 
promotion of staff, in a manner that values collaborative capacity, had among the 
lowest ratings of all the collaboration activities evaluated. A reason for this may 
be that human resource processes such as these are the most deeply embedded 
in organizations and the most difficult to change to meet emerging needs. These 
processes also may be the most attached to, and illustrative of, an organization’s 
culture; and culture may be most sharply demonstrated by the manner in which 
an organization incentivizes and rewards behavior. It should be noted, however, 
that changing recruiting and promoting processes also requires the least amount 
of resources—time and money—to align with current strategies. Updating 
recruitment and promotional objectives in order to demonstrate value of 
collaborative capacity skills may be the most cost effective way for state EMAs to 
make significant progress in all needed areas. Outdated, incomplete or 
inadequate position descriptions and recruiting strategies should be revised to 
include the skills needed to meet the emerging demands of the emergency 
management discipline. Many of these skills may already exist in state EMA 
organizations, and demonstrating the value of such skills in hiring and 
promotional practices will serve to reinforce and reward these capabilities. 
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Another benefit of improved staffing and training practices for collaboration 
is that state EMA staff who understand the emerging demands of the discipline, 
and the corresponding collaborative capacities, can be empowered to improve 
their collaboration effectiveness by promoting collaboration successes from 
within their organizations. Staff can also work within many local, state-level and 
professional emergency management organizations to promote structures that 
enhance rather than inhibit collaborative capacity. 
 
• State emergency managers should consider a platform for 
collaboration with each other, to share lessons learned, best practices, 
innovations and challenges in working with volunteers, the private sector, diverse 
communities and social media .  
 
Currently there exist mutual aid agreements between states, and informal 
email networks of certain state EMA functions such as hazard mitigation and PIO 
(Public Information Officer). There is NEMA for the top leadership of state EMAs. 
However, there is no platform for state EMA staff on the whole to communicate 
with each other. State EMA staff interact ad hoc at professional association 
meetings and FEMA conferences and trainings, but the portion of staff able to 
travel to these events represents only a fraction of agencies. Because the needs 
and requirements of state EMAs are unique, it would be useful to have a 
communication and collaboration mechanism devoted to emergency 
management at the state level. A simple listserv for broadcasting relevant news 
and posing questions to members might be beneficial, and could serve as a 
membership mechanism for states to gather at national conferences. The UASIs 
have a listserv for this purpose that has become in many ways the de facto 
source for news of congressional homeland security and emergency 
management funding, and has also been the source for sharing practices among 
members. Technologies for collaboration are not limited to email, and therefore 
resources to initiate sharing of information among state EMAs should not be a 
factor. 
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• Reasons for the differences in collaborative capacity between 
military-based and civilian-based state EMAs should be explored.  
A second important finding of the research for this thesis is that the 
structural organization of a state EMA affects its ability to develop collaborative 
capacities. Those organizations within state military departments have been 
shown by this research to be less actively engaged in collaborative activities that 
match the emerging demands of their discipline. Those organizations within 
civilian-based structures report more collaborative than their military counterparts 
by a significant degree. 
This study demonstrates that organizational structure has an impact, but 
does not include any evidence as to reasons for the impact. Organizational 
culture differences between military and civilian organizations, and their 
implications, abound in the literature. These studies and findings should be 
applied to state EMA organizations, with further research as indicated. State 
military functions will always have an important role in large and catastrophic 
disaster response, and the need for civil-military staff collaboration will continue. 
To increase collaborative capacity in state military organizations, the reasons that 
stunt collaboration in those organizations—whether cultural or otherwise—should 
be explored, and opportunities sought for increasing both individual and 
organizational collaborative skills. 
Why should military-based state EMAs appear to have less collaborative 
capacity than civilian-based EMAs?  Military experience is valued universally in 
the emergency management field, not just because state governments 
emphasize—and sometimes require—the hiring of military veterans. Military 
experience provides breadth in protocol development, training, exercises and 
logistics management that is valuable in disaster planning and response. But 
problems may occur when military experience is the only experience sought or 
valued in the hiring process: the “soft skills” needed for partnering, for building 
relationships with diverse communities and for forging a shared vision of the 
future may be missing from the military-trained skills palette. 
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“When I was starting out” says Kathleen Tierney, director of the Natural 
Hazards Research Center at the University of Colorado at Boulder, “it was 
assumed that an emergency manager should be a retired military person who 
had a really good understanding of command and control issues and now there’s 
been a lot more thinking about what the skills and competencies [are] that go into 
making a good emergency manager.”  She continues, “I think the field has 
become more professionalized as indicated by certification programs, the 
existence of many professional associations for emergency managers, and also 
specialized journals in emergency management.” (Pittman 2012) These 
sentiments describe a shift in thinking about the breadth of skills needed today in 
the emergency management discipline, and the assumption of military command 
and control as the sole or primary skill for emergency management as possibly 
outdated. 
5.1 CONCLUSION 
The implications of these thesis findings with regard to the emergency 
management ecosystem are important. Our view of this ecosystem has matured 
to the extent that we understand the full connectedness of the partners, ranging 
from individual citizens in communities all the way to the White House. But the 
majority of our existing preparedness planning efforts, national incident 
management systems and local response network protocols are still based on 
the notion of a system that works separately from the citizens it serves—a 
system that is largely based on a civil defense model that views disasters as 
events requiring a military action-based response. Reconciling this notion with 
recognition of the importance of collaboration to meet the emergency 
management demands of the future will require strategic action from all partners 
in the emergency management network. 
From a national perspective, the findings of this research will be useful to 
FEMA for advancing preparedness initiatives and improvements. Further study of 
the implications of military-based EMAs may reveal policy improvements that can 
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be suggested to states without radically altering existing state EMA structures. As 
FEMA collaborates with states and the National Guard to explore whole of 
government partnerships, alternative or hybrid structures may emerge that have 
no form today.  Barring radical changes, incremental improvements may be 
identified that can improve preparedness planning and collaboration toward an 
ultimate, more complete future solution. 
Today’s state EMA’s face complex legal, practical and philosophical 
questions about what constitutes effective prevention, protection, mitigation, 
response and recovery. Leadership in this environment requires skills in working 
with diverse communities; a depth of understanding in the causes of 
radicalization that often leads to extreme violent acts; collaborative skills in 
partnering with the private sector, volunteers and nongovernmental 
organizations; and strategic planning and action in a complex adaptive system. 
For many states it also means working with other states, federal agencies and 
neighboring countries on difficult border issues. State emergency managers need 
political skills in working with governors, and technical skills in information 
management, interoperable communications, law enforcement aviation and 
urban rescue equipment. Additionally, since the bulk of many state EMA 
operations is funded by federal program dollars, leaders need a full 
understanding of multiple funding program objectives, federal regulations, and 
the issues of grants reform. The findings of this research offer a measure of 
where state EMAs stand in developing collaborative capacity. It is hoped that 
further research will be done to expand on this important work, and that the 
recommendations offered here will help lead our nation toward a readiness for a 
prepared, resilient future. 
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APPENDIX A.  TEXT OF SURVEY INVITATION EMAIL SENT 
TO EACH OF FIFTY STATES 
Dear State Emergency Management Colleagues: 
 
You are invited to participate in a survey designed to assess the collaborative 
capacities of state emergency management agencies. I am conducting this study 
for my thesis in partial fulfillment for a master's degree at the Naval Postgraduate 
School Center for Homeland Defense. 
 
The survey is expected to take 20-25 minutes to complete. It is web-based and 
completely anonymous. Participant-specific data will not be identified or stored. 
You do not have to answer every question. Participation is entirely voluntary and 




If clicking the link does not work, please copy and paste it into your browser.  
 
This survey will be active until July 12, 2012. 
 
This email invitation is being sent to the emergency management agencies in all 
fifty states. Email addresses in the message distribution have been gleaned from 
publicly available sources and may not be comprehensive or current. Please feel 
free to pass this email on to others in your organization, to offer them the 
opportunity to participate. 
 
If you are interested in a copy of the completed research, please contact me at 
jenniferschaal@gmail.com or (253) 720-8551. 
 
Thanks for your time! 
 
Jennifer Schaal 
Washington State Emergency Management Division  
 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  99 
APPENDIX B.  TEXT OF ON-LINE SURVEY OF STATE 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCIES CONDUCTED JUNE 
17–JULY 12, 2012 
Q1 - Consent to Participate in Anonymous Survey 
 
You are invited to participate in this research study entitled "Assessing the 
Collaborative Capacity of State Emergency Management Agencies." The 
purpose of the research is to study emergency management activities at the 
state government level that involve collaboration with other organizations and 
communities. 
 
This survey will be conducted via Survey Monkey. Only answers to survey 
questions will be collected. No personal identifying data will be collected or 
stored. Survey responses will be presented anonymously to the Researcher. 
There is minimal risk that data collected could be mismanaged. 
 
This survey is expected to take 20-25 minutes to complete. Your participation is 
voluntary. If you participate, you are free to skip any questions or stop 
participating at any time without penalty. The alternative to participating is to not 
participate, which you may choose by clicking the "I do not wish to participate" 
button below. Your responses to the survey are anonymous. 
 
The anticipated benefit of this study is to add to the body of research about best 
practices for state emergency management agency inter-organizational 
collaboration to meet emerging needs of the discipline. You may receive a copy 
of the completed research by contacting the Researcher at 
jenniferschaal@gmail.com or (253) 720-8551. Contacting the Researcher does 
not affect the anonymity of your participation in the study. 
 
If you have questions about this research, contact Naval Postgraduate School 
Associate Professor Susan Hocevar at shocevar@nps.edu or (831) 656-2249. If 
you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, contact Naval 
Postgraduate School Internal Review Board (IRB) Chair Capt. John Schmidt at 
jkschmid@nps.edu or (831) 656-3864. 
 
Please select one of the following choices: 
 I consent to participate in this study.     
 I do not consent to participate in this study. 
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Q2 - Please indicate how your state’s emergency management agency is 
structured: 
 
o My agency reports to my state’s Office of the Governor. 
o My agency reports to my state’s Public Safety Department. 
o My agency reports to my state’s Homeland Security/State Police 
Department.  
o My agency reports to my state’s Military Department. 
o I don’t know how my agency is structured. 
o If your organization’s structure does not fit the options above, please 
explain how it is structured.  _______________________ 
 
 
Q3 - With regard to your answer in Question (1), has your agency changed 
its organizational structure: 
 
o Within the past year? 
o Within the past five years? 
o Within the past ten years? 
o My agency has not changed its organizational structure 
o My agency is in the midst of, or is planning, a change in organizational 
structure. 
o I don’t know if my agency has changed its organizational structure. 
o If your agency has changed or is changing its organizational structure, if 




Q4 - My agency’s size is: 
 
o Over 300 employees 
o 200-299 employees 
o 100-199 employees 
o 50-99 employees 
o Under 50 employees 
 
Q5 - In this survey, "collaboration" means state emergency management 
agencies working with other organizations to achieve common goals. Other 
organizations may include: other state agencies; neighboring state governments; 
DHS and FEMA program offices; FEMA regional administration; local and tribal 
governments and responders; state and local boards and commissions; 
emergency management professional/advocacy organizations; federal and state 
congressional representatives; educational institutions; nongovernmental 
organizations; federal law enforcement; faith-based and other community 
organizations; and private sector organizations, to name a few. 
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There is agreement within my organization about the purpose and value of 
inter-organizational collaboration. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q6 - The success of my organization's mission requires collaborating 
effectively with other organizations. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q7 - My agency has clearly established goals for inter-organizational 
collaboration. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q8 - My agency takes a lead role in forming inter-organizational teams for 
preparedness planning and prevention. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q9 – My agency’s policies emphasize relationship building with other 
organizations. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q10 - My agency makes training available in relationship-building skills. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
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Q11 - My agency always seeks a mutually beneficial solution when 
negotiating agreements with other organizations.   
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q12 - My agency has established protocols for sharing resources with 
other organizations. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q13 - The people in my agency show respect for differing points of view in 
other organizations. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q14 - My agency collaborates with other organizations even when there are 
no financial/funding incentives. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q15 - My organization's leaders regularly meet and confer with the leaders 
of other organizations about mutual collaboration. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q16 - My agency works with other organizations to build a shared vision of 
future emergency management challenges. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
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Q17 - When recruiting new staff, my agency clearly values collaboration 
skills. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q18 - When promoting staff, my agency clearly values collaboration skills. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q19 - The next few questions focus on collaboration with diverse communities, 
which can mean not only communities that are geographically determined, but 
also to groups that have common interests or concerns related to emergency 
management (e.g., nationalities, religious beliefs, languages, economic 
situations, special physical needs or mental needs). 
 
 
My agency’s policies emphasize relationship building with local 
communities. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q20 - My agency has developed relationships with local communities, to 
work together to build community resilience to disasters. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q21 - My agency works with local communities to implement efforts to 
prevent radicalization, especially of youth, that often leads to violent 
acts. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
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Q22 - When recruiting new staff, my agency clearly values expertise in 
relationship building with local communities. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q23 - When promoting staff, my agency clearly values expertise in 
relationship building with local communities. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q24 - My agency has clearly established goals for soliciting, training and 
utilizing volunteers. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q25 - My agency solicits input from volunteers and uses that input to 
shape its volunteer program. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q26 - My agency has protocols in place for credentialing volunteers for 
disaster response. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
Q27 - My agency provides training in volunteer management to agency 
staff. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
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Q28 - When recruiting new staff, my agency clearly values expertise in 
soliciting and utilizing volunteers. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q29 - When promoting staff, my agency clearly values expertise in 
soliciting and utilizing volunteers. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q30 - In this survey, "social media and networks" means social connection 
websites such as Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, etc., and the corresponding “apps” 
that allow instant two-way communications via websites, smartphones and other 
technologies. 
 
My agency uses social media tools and networks to communicate with 
local communities. 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q31 - My agency makes information about volunteer opportunities for 
emergency management work available through websites or social 
media sites. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
Q32 - My agency provides training in social media technologies for staff to 
use in collaborating with other organizations. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
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Q33 - My agency works with other organizations to develop new “apps” for 
emergency preparedness planning and crisis management. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q34 - My agency devotes resources (money and time) for learning about 
emerging social media technologies potentially useful to emergency 
preparedness planning and crisis management. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q35 - When recruiting new staff, my agency clearly values expertise in 
social media and other technologies useful to emergency preparedness 
planning and crisis management. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q36 - When promoting staff, my agency clearly values expertise in social 
media and other technologies useful to emergency preparedness 
planning and crisis management. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 





Q38 - My agency has agreements in place with private sector organizations 
to share responsibilities in disasters. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
  107 
Q39 - My agency takes the needs and capabilities of private sector 
organizations into account in disaster management planning. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q40 - My agency collaborates with private sector organizations on cyber 
security issues. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q41 - My agency collaborates with private sector organizations on critical 
infrastructure protection issues. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q42 - My agency provides training in working with private sector 
organizations. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q43 - My agency provides training in how to protect private sector 
proprietary sensitive or information. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
 
Q44 - When recruiting new staff, my agency clearly values private sector 
partnering skills. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
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Q45 - When promoting staff, my agency clearly values private sector 
partnering skills. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
Q46 - The next few questions are about social capital. In this survey, social 
capital means the number and strength of work group, social group, 
faith/community group, family, friend, acquaintance, and professional 
colleague relationships that individuals, communities and organizations can 
draw upon in times of need. 
 
My agency has taken action to engage all relevant stakeholders in 
preparedness planning and prevention. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
Q47 - My agency has worked with stakeholders to define and agree on 
collective outcomes. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
Q48 - My agency has a method for measuring mutually agreed-upon 
collective outcomes. 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
Q49 - My agency has a method for measuring its "social capital.” 
 
                   Strongly        Strongly 
                   Disagree         Agree 
1      2      3      4      5      6 
 
Q50 - If there was one thing that could be done in your agency to improve 
inter-organizational collaboration, what would that be?  
 
 Answer______________________________ 
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APPENDIX C.  SURVEY QUESTIONS ORDERED BY SCALE OF 
POSITIVE RESPONSE, HIGHEST TO LOWEST 
 







Success of our mission requires collaboration (Q6) 171 5.7 .9 
Agree on purpose, value of inter-organizational collaboration (Q5) 170 4.9 1.3 
We collaborate even when there are no financial incentives (Q14) 170 4.9 1.3 
Policies emphasize relationship building w/local communities (Q19) 169 4.7 1.4 
Agency takes lead role in forming inter-organizational teams (Q8) 170 4.7 1.3 
Agency has developed relationships with local communities (Q20) 171 4.6 1.3 
Policies emphasize relationship building w/other organizations (Q9) 169 4.5 1.5 
Agency has established protocols for sharing resources (Q12) 169 4.5 1.4 
Seeks mutually beneficial solutions in negotiating agreements (Q11) 169 4.4 1.3 
Leaders regularly meet w/other org leaders to collaborate (Q15) 170 4.4 1.3 
Use social media to communicate with local communities (Q30) 171 4.4 1.5 
Clearly established goals for inter-organizational collaboration (Q7) 170 4.4 1.4 
Builds shared vision of future emergency mgmt challenges (Q16) 169 4.3 1.5 
Collaborates w/private sector on critical infrastructure issues (Q41) 165 4.3 1.5 
Engages relevant sectors in emergency preparedness planning (Q46) 168 4.3 1.3 
People show respect for differing points of view in other orgs (Q13) 170 4.2 1.4 
Accounts for private sector needs, capabilities in disaster plans (Q39) 169 4.2 1.4 
Works w/stakeholders to define & agree on collective outcomes 
(Q47) 
168 4.1 1.4 
Agreements in place w/private sector to share responsibilities (Q38) 167 4.0 1.6 
When recruiting, agency values collaboration skills (Q17) 169 3.8 1.5 
When recruiting, agency values local community relation skills (Q22) 164 3.8 1.6 
When promoting, agency values collaboration skills (Q18) 165 3.7 1.5 
When promoting, agency values local community relation skills 
(Q23) 
165 3.7 1.5 
Agency provides training in relationship building skills (Q10) 170 3.7 1.6 
Clearly established goals for soliciting, training volunteers (Q24) 165 3.6 1.6 
Solicits input from volunteers, uses to shape volunteer program 
(Q25) 
165 3.5 1.6 
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Uses social media to communicate volunteer opportunities (Q31) 165 3.4 1.6 
Agency has developed method to measure collective outcomes (Q48) 161 3.4 1.5 
Protocols in place for credentialing volunteers in disasters (Q26) 165 3.3515 1.70296 
Collaborates with private sector on cyber security issues (Q40) 165 3.3273 1.52285 
When recruiting, agency values private sector partnering skills (Q44) 157 3.2994 1.52528 
Agency provides training in working w/private sector (Q42) 164 3.7683 1.54918 
Agency provides training in volunteer management (Q27) 167 3.2635 1.59896 
When promoting, agency values private sector partnering skills 
(Q45) 
157 3.2102 1.48078 
Agency provides training in private sector proprietary info (Q43) 162 3.1296 1.59634 
Agency devotes resources to learning about new social media (Q34) 166 3.0904 1.58715 
When recruiting, agency values skills in working w/volunteers (Q28) 162 3.0123 1.46592 
When promoting, agency values skills in working w/volunteers (Q29) 162 2.9074 1.45237 
Works w/other organizations to develop emergency management 
apps (Q33) 
165 2.8606 1.71043 
When recruiting, agency values social media skills (Q35) 163 2.8589 1.51485 
Agency provides training in social media (Q32) 167 2.8263 1.56768 
When promoting, agency values social media skills (Q36) 163 2.8221 1.47372 
Agency has method for measuring social capital (Q49) 162 2.6914 1.46717 
Works w/local communities to prevent radicalization/violence (Q21) 163 2.6319 1.42706  
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APPENDIX D.  SURVEY QUESTION ITEM-LEVEL MEANS–SEVEN 
COLLABORATION FACTORS 
The following is a table of survey results showing the mean and standard 
deviation for each of the seven collaboration factors, with mean and standard 








Strategic action for collaboration 4.8 1.1 
Success of our mission requires collaboration (Q6) 5.7 0.9 
Agree on purpose, value of inter-organizational collaboration (Q5) 4.9 1.3 
We collaborate even when there are no financial incentives (Q14) 4.9 1.3 
Seeks mutually beneficial solutions in negotiating agreements (Q11) 4.4 1.3 
Clearly established goals for inter-organizational collaboration (Q7) 4.4 1.4 
People show respect for differing points of view in other orgs (Q13) 4.2 1.4 
Operational action for collaboration 4.1 1.2 
Agency takes lead role in forming inter-organizational teams (Q8) 4.7 1.3 
Policies emphasize relationship building w/other organizations (Q9) 4.5 1.5 
Agency has established protocols for sharing resources (Q12) 4.5 1.4 
Leaders regularly meet w/other org leaders to collaborate (Q15) 4.4 1.3 
Builds shared vision of future emergency management challenges 
(Q16) 
4.3 1.5 
When recruiting, agency values collaboration skills (Q17) 3.9 1.5 
When promoting, agency values collaboration skills (Q18) 3.7 1.5 
Agency provides training in relationship building skills (Q10) 3.7 1.6 
Collaboration with local/diverse communities 3.9 1.2 
Policies emphasize relationship building w/local communities (Q19) 4.7 1.4 
Agency has developed relationships with local communities (Q20) 4.6 1.3 
When recruiting, agency values local community relation skills (Q22) 3.8 1.6 







   
When promoting, agency values local community relation skills (Q23) 3.7 1.5 
Works w/local communities to prevent radicalization/violence (Q21) 2.6 1.4 
Building social capital 3.6 1.3 
Engages relevant sectors in emergency preparedness planning (Q46) 4.3 1.3 
Works w/stakeholders to define & agree on collective outcomes (Q47) 4.1 1.4 
Agency has developed method to measure collective outcomes (Q48) 3.4 1.5 
Agency has method for measuring social capital (Q49) 2.7 1.5 
Collaboration with private sector 3.6 1.3 
Collaborates w/private sector on critical infrastructure issues (Q41) 4.3 1.5 
Accounts for private sector needs, capabilities in disaster plans (Q39) 4.2 1.4 
Agreements in place w/private sector to share responsibilities (Q38) 4.0 1.6 
Agency provides training in working w/private sector (Q42) 3.8 1.6 
Collaborates with private sector on cyber security issues (Q40) 3.3 1.5 
When recruiting, agency values private sector partnering skills (Q44) 3.3 1.5 
When promoting, agency values private sector partnering skills (Q45) 3.2 1.5 
Agency provides training in private sector proprietary info (Q43) 3.1 1.6 
Collaboration with volunteers 3.3 1.4 
Clearly established goals for soliciting, training volunteers (Q24) 3.6 1.6 
Solicits input from volunteers, uses to shape volunteer program (Q25) 3.5 1.6 
Protocols in place for credentialing volunteers in disasters (Q26) 3.4 1.7 
Agency provides training in volunteer management (Q27) 3.3 1.6 
When recruiting, agency values skills in working w/volunteers (Q28) 3.0 1.5 
When promoting, agency values skills in working w/volunteers (Q29) 2.9 1.5 
Use of social media and networks     3.2 1.4 
Use social media to communicate with local communities (Q30) 4.4 1.5 
Uses social media to communicate volunteer opportunities (Q31) 3.4 1.6 
Agency devotes resources to learning about new social media (Q34) 3.1 1.6 







   
Works w/other organizations to develop emergency mgmt apps (Q33) 2.9 1.7 
When recruiting, agency values social media skills (Q35) 2.9 1.5 
Agency provides training in social media (Q32) 2.8 1.6 
When promoting, agency values social media skills (Q36) 2.8 1.5 
Note:  Ratings based on scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree, to 6 = Strongly Agree.  
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APPENDIX E.  SURVEY RESPONSES TO THE SOCIAL MEDIA 
BEST PRACTICES QUESTION, BY STATE EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT AGENCY ORGANIZATIONAL TYPE 
 Social media best practice responses from military-based state EMAs: 
 “we just started using social media and only use it on occasion” 
 “my agency is a newcomer to social media and just in the experimental stage” 
 “putting agency items of interest out through social media” 
 “reluctantly allows some of us to moderate a blog” 
 “we are basically locked out of most internet access…absolutely forbidden to access 
social media during work hours…even if activated for a disaster and locals are using social 
media, we are still locked out, and threatened with termination of employment if we violate this…” 
 “[we have] a…Facebook page for each program and a…Current Disaster specific page 
dedicated to sharing information during the response and recovery of specific disasters” 
 “we push out emergency info via web” 
  “use of website to convey information…use of Facebook to promote earthquake 
preparedness”  
 “we have an agency Twitter account and Facebook page” 
  “use of Twitter and Facebook” 
 “we create public awareness campaigns that include public input via social media” 
 “PIO [Public Information Officer] uses Twitter and Facebook during disasters to keep 
public and media informed” 
 “restrict usage to select staff (e.g. external affairs)” 
 “our PIO is the only one authorized to post social media for the agency” 
 “PIOs use Facebook and Twitter” 
  “PIO has a blog and Twitter and is the only one allowed to put forth information…doesn’t 
use Facebook because…doesn’t want two-way conversations; social media is used strictly for 
information sharing, not collaboration or engaging the public” 
 
 Social media best practice responses from Office of the Governor-based 
state EMAs: 
 
 “the agency is just starting to move forward in this area…some counties are well ahead of 
the State” 
   “upper management does not laugh when you mention Twitter or Facebook” 
 “…we use web, Twitter, press releases and website…we also use Mass Notification” 
  116 
 “[state EMA] website for general public to use as a reference” 
 “Twitter, Facebook” 
 “we use Nixle, Twitter, Facebook” 
 “agency maximizes the use of Twitter and is dabbling in the use of Facebook” 
 “Ready App on iPhones” 
 “we have a Facebook account” 
 “public information on website…website connection to Facebook, Twitter and FlickR” 
 “pushing out daily newsletters with local information during the first several days of a 
disaster, using Facebook and Twitter as part of the means to get the information out” 
 “we monitor all social media during a major crisis response to ensure that our message is 
getting to people and is an accurate message” 
 “although a very new technique for my agency, during day-to-day and disaster, our 
external affairs unit uses social media to keep our first responders and citizens abreast of things 
happening that could impact their day” 
 “none…[state EMA] doesn’t allow its own employees to get Facebook nor promote 
Twitter, Facebook or other social tools that would benefit the agency… [instead expects] 
everyone to learn off our website ” 
 “social media is not…used within my agency at this time, it is something that we are slow 
and steady about” 
 
 Social media best practice responses from public safety office-based 
state EMAs: 
 
  “Watch Center uses social media as an additional tool to monitor/identify incidents 
occurring in the state” 
 “updates regarding status and response efforts sent out on Facebook and Twitter during 
disasters” 
 “weather watches and warnings are posted via social media…further, we are going to 
begin utilization of ‘Ping 4’ on mobile phones” 
 “state agencies are mostly blocked from social media sites and don’t use/build/monitor 
them…barely use internet sites” 
 “Facebook and Twitter pages but not updated often” 
 “Facebook, Twitter, website communication to public, media chiefly during emergencies” 
 “only the public affairs office may use social media…the rest of the organization is 
forbidden, by policy, to use it while working” 
 “our agency is on Facebook and Twitter but staff does not have access to the Facebook 
page or Twitter account due to outdated policies and a lack of initiative on the part of our IT staff 
to make the sites accessible within a policy that would govern their usage” 
 “[our state EMA] teaches local and state emergency management professionals how to 
use Twitter and other social media at conferences held across the state” 
 “public affairs office is deeply involved with FEMA and their social media initiatives…we 
use social media 24/7 with additional efforts during disasters” 
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 “we are currently working towards utilizing social media…we are in the process of hiring a 
person just for this activity” 
 “using an aggregator (like Tweetdeck or Hootsuite), we’ve begun tracking social media 
during incidents…when possible we’d like to promote a #hashtag prior to weather or other 
widespread events to help us filter and refine searches more quickly” 
 “we are currently in the process of creating a ‘Social Media’ position” 
 “we have a Facebook and Twitter account and often post preparedness information and 
projects on these accounts…also post information about anniversaries of historical disasters to 
remind citizens of the hazards and their impacts…during an event we monitor social media to 
ensure we have an accurate picture of what is happening…we also look at YouTube for videos of 
the scene” 
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APPENDIX F.  A SCAN OF STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
AGENCY WEBSITES JULY 2011 
The following is a by-state detail of emergency management organizations, 
gleaned from state websites. (All links referenced were accessed July 24–27, 
2011.)  In listing “Services” the intent was to glean functional actions that could 
be taken by stakeholders accessing the agency’s website. The purpose of 
differentiating between the two was to discern how the agency approached 
emergency management as a discipline, versus their website managers listing 
yellow-pages-type content they thought would be useful. For example, 
information local emergency managers could use to plan or act, such as weather 
mapping or up-to-date hazard alerts was included, but web links to other news or 
sources were not. For another example, if guidance or templates for planning 
activities was offered, or access to boards or commissions that engaged in 
emergency planning activity, then “Planning” as a function was included; if 
merely lists of existing plans were offered, this was not included. There were 
understandably many gray areas to this discernment. 
 
Alabama:   
Emergency Management Agency (EMA) 
http://ema.alabama.gov/. 
Parent Organization is Office of the Governor 
Services: CERT, Citizen Corps, Disaster Recovery, Family Disaster Planning, FEMA 
Assistance, Hazard Mitigation Assistance, Hazardous Weather Guide, Housing 
Recovery, Preparedness Planning, Risk Analysis Mapping, Special Needs Planning, 
Weather Information 
 
Alaska:   
Division of Homeland Security & Emergency Management Agency (DHS&EM) 
http://www.ak-prepared.com/. 
Parent Organization is Military [& Veterans Affairs] 
Services: Grants, Interoperable Communications, Infrastructure Protection, LEPC, 
Mitigation, Planning, Public Outreach, Security Vulnerability Assessment, State 
Emergency Response Commission, Training & Exercise 
 
Arizona:   
Division of Emergency Management Agency (AZDEMA) 
http://www.ak-prepared.com/. 
Parent Organization is Military Department 
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Services: CERT, EMAP, Hazard Mitigation, Hazardous Materials, Homeland Security, 
Logistics, National Shelter System, Radiological Preparedness, Recovery, Special 
Needs Planning, Training & Exercise, Tribal Relations 
 
Arkansas:   
Department of Emergency Management (ADEM) 
http://www.dem.azdema.gov/. 
Parent Organization is Office of the Governor 
Services: Administration [CSEPP, CERT, Homeland Security Branch, Fire Services, 
Mitigation] Disaster Management [Area Coordination, Operations, Recovery], Federal 
Surplus, Communications [Response Coordination], Preparedness [Earthquakes, 
Exercise, Law Enforcement, Planning, CERT, Training] 
 
California:   
Emergency Management Agency (Cal-EMA) 
http://www.oes.ca.gov/. 
Parent Organization is Office of the Governor 
Services: Access & Functional Needs, Administration [Grants Monitoring], Audits & 
Evaluations, Legislative Affairs, Fire & Rescue, Homeland Security [Citizen 
Preparedness, Grants, Human Trafficking, Information Analysis Watch & Warning, 
Infrastructure Protection, Planning & Research, Training & Exercises], Law Enforcement 
& Victim Services [Children Victim Services, Domestic  
Violence, Drugs, Gangs, Sexual Assault], Public Safety & Victim Services; Regional 
Response, Recovery 
 
Colorado:   
Division of Emergency Management (DEM) 
 http://dola.colorado.gov/dem/index.html.  
Parent Organization is Department of Local Affairs 
Services: CSEPP (Chemical Stockpile Emergency Program), Disaster Business 
Planning, Emergency Planning Commission, Exercises, Field Services, Hazard 
Preparedness, MACC (Multi-Agency Coordination Center), Mitigation, Operations, 
Plans, Recovery, Training 
 
Connecticut:   
Department of Emergency Management & Homeland Security (DEMHS); currently being 
consolidated into a Department of Emergency Services & Public Protection 
http://www.ct.gov/demhs/site/default.asp.  
Parent Organization is Office of the Governor 
Services: 911 Special Needs Registration, Citizen Corps, Communications, Coordination 
Councils, Grants, Legislative/Government Relations, Natural Hazards, Planning, Public 
Assistance, Radiological Preparedness, Regional Incident Management Teams, State 
Response Framework, Strategic Planning, Training & Exercise, USAR 
 
Delaware:   
Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) 
http://dema.delaware.gov/default.shtml. 
Parent Organization is the Department of Safety and Homeland Security 
Services: Citizen Corps, Disaster Preparedness, Hazardous Materials Information, 
Partner Information, State of Emergency Driving Information, Training & Education 
  121 
Florida:   
Divison of Emergency Management (Cal-EMA) 
http://www.floridadisaster.org/. 
Parent Organization is Office of the Governor 
Services: Business Preparedness, Disability Disaster Information, Family Preparedness, 
Kids Preparedness, Mitigation, Natural Hazards, Request a Speaker, Response, 
Recovery, State Emergency Response Team, Threat Reporting, Training & Exercise 
 
Georgia:   
Emergency Management Agency/Homeland Security (GEMA) 
http://www.gema.state.ga.us/. 
Parent Organization is Office of the Governor 
Services: 911, Citizen Corps, Donations & Volunteers, Evacuation Maps, Excess 
Property, Hazard Mitigation, Hurricanes, Insurance, ISAC, Local Government 
Assistance, Newsroom, Public Assistance, Radiological Preparedness, School Safety, 
Survivor Resources, Threat Reporting, Training & Exercises 
 
Hawaii:   
State Civil Defense 
http://www.scd.hawaii.gov/index.html. 
Parent Organization is Military Department 
Services: Amateur Radio, Debris Cleanup, Disaster History 1955-2011, 
Earthquake/Tropical Storm History 2006-2011, Emergency Alert System, Hazard 
Mitigation, Hazmat Training, Preparedness, Recovery, Public Assistance, Satellite 
Mapping, Shelter-In-Place, Special Needs, Tsunamis, WMD Training 
 
Idaho:   
Bureau of Homeland Security 
http://www.bhs.idaho.gov/. 
Parent Organization is Military Department 
Services: Business Preparedness, COOP, Critical Infrastructure, Disaster Assistance, 
Grants, Hazardous Materials, Hazards Preparedness, Logistics, Mitigation, 
Neighborhood Preparedness, Pet Preparedness, Recovery, Response, School 
Preparedness, Training & Exercise, Volunteering, Warning Systems  
 
Illinois:   
Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) 
http://www.state.il.us/iema/.  225 employees, $618 million budget 
Parent Organization is Office of the Governor 
Services: Disaster Preparedness, Earthquake Information, Interoperable 
Communications, FOIA, Lightning Safety, Homeland Security, Mammography Facility 
Certification, Mitigation, Nuclear Safety, Recovery, Response, State Emergency 
Response Commission, Planning, Public Assistance, Terrorism Preparedness, Training 
& Exercises 
 
Indiana:   
Emergency Management Agencies and Field Services 
http://www.in.gov/dhs/2797.htm. 
Parent Organization is Department of Homeland Security 
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Services: Building Plan Review, Certification, Emergency Response & Recovery, Field 
Services, Fire & Building Safety Services, Grants Management, Inspections, Mitigation, 
Permitting, Planning & Assessment, Preparedness, Training & Exercises 
 
Iowa:   
Homeland Security & Emergency Management (HSEMD) 
http://www.iowahomelandsecurity.org/. 
Parent Organization is Military Department 
Services: CERT, Citizen Corps, Citizen Preparedness, Critical Infrastructure, Disaster 
History 1951-2011, EMAC, Grants, Hazard Mitigation, Immigration & Citizenship 
Disclaimer, Interoperable Communications, Kids & Disasters, LEPC, Public Assistance, 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness, Special Populations, Training & Exercise 
 
Kansas:   
Division of Emergency Management (KDEM) 
http://www.kansastag.gov/kdem_default.asp. 
Parent Organization is Military Department 
Services: Commissions, Donations, Flood Info, GIS Mapping, Mitigation, Planning, 
Preparedness, Public Assistance, Recovery, Technological Hazards, Training & 
Exercises 
 
Kentucky:   
Division of Emergency Management (KYEM) 
http://www.kansastag.gov/kdem_default.asp. 
Parent Organization is Military Department 
Services: Acronyms & Definitions, CSEPP, Earthquake Program, EMAP, Hazard 
Mitigation, Hazardous Materials, LEPC, Planning, Public Assistance, Response, SAR, 
Training & Exercises 
 
Louisiana:   
Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness  (GOHSEP) 
http://gohsep.la.gov/. 
Parent Organization is Office of the Governor 
Services: Alerts & Warnings, Biological, Cyber Security, Drought, Dams, Evacuation 
Mapping & Planning, Fire, Flooding, Hazardous Materials, Heat, Hurricanes, 
Interoperable Communications, Legal Counsel for Disaster Recovery, Mitigation, Pet 
Planning Videos, Nuclear, Recovery, Response, Terrorism, Thunderstorms, Winter 
Weather 
 
Maine:   
Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) 
http://www.state.me.us/mema/. 
Parent Organization is Military Department 
Services: Citizen Terrorism Preparedness, Grants, Hazardous Materials, Homeland 
Security, Information & Analysis Center, Mitigation, Planning, River Flow Advisory 
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Maryland:   
Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) 
http://www.mema.state.md.us/MEMA/index.jsp. 
Parent Organization is Military Department? 
Services: Business Preparedness, Family Preparedness, Floods, Hurricanes, Kids 
Preparedness, Livestock, Mitigation, Pets, Public Assistance, Schools Preparedness, 
Special Needs, State Color-Coded Terrorism Advisory System, Technological Disasters, 
Training & Exercise 
 
Massachusetts:   
Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) 
http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=eopsagencylanding&L=3&L0=Home&L1=Public+Safety+
Agencies&L2=Massachusetts+Emergency+Management+Agency&sid=Eeops.  
Parent Organization is Public Safety 
Services: 211, Donations & Volunteer Efforts, EMAC, Evacuation Steps, Floodplain 
Management, Hazard Mitigation, Heat, Hurricanes, Nuclear Preparedness, Planning, 
Power Outage Safety, Public Assistance, Rebuilding, Severe Weather, State Emergency 
Response Commission, Tornadoes, Training, Traffic & Weather Info 
 
Michigan:   
Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division (EMHSD) 
http://www.michigan.gov/msp/0,1607,7-123-1593_3507_5909---,00.html.  
Parent Organization is Michigan State Police 
Services: 911, Citizen Awareness & Preparedness, Citizen Corps, Hazardous Materials, 




Homeland Security & Emergency Management Agency (HSEM) 
https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/hsem/Pages/default.aspx. 
Parent Organization is Public Safety 
Services: All-Hazards Planning, Disaster Recovery, EMAC, Emergency Alert System, 
EPCRA, Grants, Hazard Mitigation, Homeland Security & Emergency Response, 
Radiological Planning, School Safety Center, Weather Awareness & Preparedness, 
Training 
 
Mississippi:   
Emergency Management Agency (MSEMA) 
http://www.msema.org/.  
Parent Organization is Office of the Governor 
Services: Disaster Planning, Earthquakes, Exercise, Floods, Hazard Mitigation, 
Hurricanes, Logistics, Radiological Preparedness, Recovery, Response, Safe Rooms, 
Severe Weather, Nuclear, Training, Transparency, Winter Weather 
 
Missouri:   
State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) 
http://sema.dps.mo.gov/. 
Parent Organization is Public Safety  
Services: All-Hazard Planning, Dam Failure, Disaster History 1957-2011, 
Donate/Volunteer, Earthquakes, Extreme Heat, Fires, Floodplain Management & 
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Insurance, GIS Mapping, Health & Safety Considerations, Mitigation, Public Assistance, 
Radiological Preparedness, Recovery Partnership, Response, Scams & Fraud 
Avoidance, Nuclear, Tornadoes, Thunderstorms, Training & Exercises, Transparency, 
Severe Winter Weather. Weather Information 
 
Montana:   
Disaster & Emergency Services Divison (DES) 
http://dma.mt.gov/des/. 
Parent Organization is Military Department  
Services: Avalanche, CERT, Chemical/Biological Warfare, Dam Failures, Drought, 
Earthquakes, Flooding, Hazardous Materials, Hazmat, Homeland Security, 
Landslide/Mudflow, Mutual Aid, Nuclear Attack, Severe Weather, Soil Failure, State 
Emergency Response Commission, Tornados, Training, Vector-Borne Diseases, 
Volcanic Fallout, Wildland Fires 
 
Nebraska:   
Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) 
http://www.nema.ne.gov/index.shtml. 
Parent Organization is Military Department 
Services: Amateur Radio System, Citizen Corps, Emergency Alert System, Flooding, 
Grants, Hazard Mitigation, Homeland Security, Interoperable Communications, Planning, 
Public Assistance, Technological Hazards, Training & Exercises  
 
Nevada:   
Department of Emergency Management (DEM) 
http://dem.state.nv.us/. 
Parent Organization is Public Safety 
Services: Boards & Commissions, Grants Management, Mitigation, Planning, Recovery, 
Traffic Information, Training & Exercises, VOAD, Wildfires 
 
New Hampshire:   
Homeland Security & Emergency Management (HSEM) 
http://www.nh.gov/safety/divisions/hsem/. 50 employees 
Parent Organization is [Public] Safety  
Services: Bioterrorism, Boards & Commissions, Citizen Corps, Disaster Behavioral 
Health, Emergency Alert System, Hazard Mitigation, Hazardous Materials, Homeland 
Security, Laws & Rules, Natural Hazards, Nuclear Power Plants, Planning, Training 
 
New Jersey:   
Emergency Management and Homeland Security (EMHSD) 
http://www.state.nj.us/njoem/. 
Parent Organization is Michigan State Police 
Services: Access & Functional Needs Preparedness Planning, Business & Industry 
Preparedness Planning, Citizen Corps, CERT & Teen CERT, Disaster Public 
Assistance, Disaster Reservist Program, Exercise Support Team, Evacuation Routes, 
Fire Corps, Local Government Preparedness Planning, Local Officials Training, Medical 
Reserve Corps, Mitigation & Reducing Risk, Neighborhood Watch Program, Nuclear 
Emergency Planning, Partner Information, Pet Preparedness Planning, Protective 
Actions, Schools & Day Care Preparedness Planning, Training, Volunteers in Police 
Service, USAR, Weather & Traffic Information 
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New Mexico:   
Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (NMDHSEM) 
http://www.nmdhsem.org/. 
Parent Organization is Office of the Governor 
Services: Communications, Fusion Center, Grants, Hazmat, Mitigation, Preparedness, 
Response & Recovery, USAR 
 
New York:   
Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services (DHSES) 
http://www.dhses.ny.gov/.  
Parent Organization is Office of the Governor 
Services: Alerts, COOP Planning, Counterterrorism, Cyber Security, Equipment, Fire, 
FOIL (FOIA), GIS Clearinghouse, Grants, Hazard Mitigation, Interoperable 
Communications, Laws & Policies, Mass Fatality Planning, Pandemic, Planning, 
Radiological Planning, Threat Reporting, Training 
 
North Carolina:   
Division of Emergency Management 
http://www.nccrimecontrol.org/Index2.cfm?a=000003,000010. 
Parent Organization is [Crime Control &] Public Safety  
Services: Emergency Alert System, Emergency Management Association, Community 
Preparedness, Family Preparedness, Floodplain Mapping, Fusion Centers, GIS U.S. 
Hazard Mapping, Grants, Hazardous Materials, Homeland Security, Hurricanes, 
Immigration & Visa Issues, Interoperable Communications, Medical Surge, Mutual Aid, 
Nuclear Plant Emergency Drills, Recovery, Severe Weather, State Emergency 
Response Commission, Threat Reporting, Tornadoes, Training & Exercise 
 
North Dakota:   
Department of Emergency Services (NDDES) 
http://www.nd.gov/des/. 
Parent Organization is Military Department 
Services: Disaster Declarations History 1993-2010, Disaster Recovery & Mitigation, 
Donations, Floods, Homeland Security, Public Assistance, Training & Exercise 
 
Ohio:   
Emergency Management Agency (EMA) 
http://ema.ohio.gov/. 
Parent Organization is Public Safety  
Services: Disaster Assistance Toolbox, Emergency Management Association, 
Interoperable Communications, NFIP, Nuclear Power Plant Emergency, Planning, 
Radiological Emergency Planning, Snow Emergency information, Training, VOAD 
 
Oklahoma:   
Department of Emergency Management (OEM) 
http://www.ok.gov/oem/. 
Parent Organization is Office of the Governor 
Functions:  Disaster & Wildfire History 2003-2011, Earthquake Safety, Flood Safety, 
Human Services, Lightning Safety, McReady, Mitigation, Planning, Preparedness, Public 
Assistance, Saferoom Information, Tornado Safety, Training, Weather Notifications, 
Wildfire Safety, Winter Weather Safety 
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Oregon:   
Emergency Management (OEM) 
http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/OEM/ 
Parent Organization is Military Department 
Services: Citizen Corps, COOP, CSEPP, Earthquakes, Grants, Mitigation, Public 
Assistance, Recovery, Training & Exercise 
 
Pennsylvania:   
Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) 
http://www.pema.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/pema_home/4463. 
Parent Organization is Office of the Governor 
Services: 911 Program, Citizenship & Immigration Disclaimer, Disaster Assistance, 
Hazard Mitigation, Community & State Planning, Grants Management, Homeland 
Security, Human Services, Infrastructure Repair, Intrastate Mutual Aid, Nuclear Power 
Plant Safety, Public Assistance, Right to Know, Threat Reporting, Training & 
Certification, USAR, VOAD, Warning & Communications Systems 
 
Rhode Island:   
Emergency Management Agency (RIEMA) 
http://www.riema.ri.gov/. 
Parent Organization is Military Department 
Services: Cyber Security, Floodplain Management, Grants, Hazards Preparedness, Kids 
Preparedness, Performance & Accountability Report, Resource Typing, SAR, Training & 
Exercises 
 
South Carolina:   
Emergency Management Division (SCEMD) 
http://www.scemd.org/. 
Parent Organization is Military Department 
Services: Civil Disorder, Coastal & Riverine Flooding, Dam Failure, Disaster Assistance 
for Farmers, Droughts, Earthquakes, Field Operations, Fires, Hurricanes & Tropical 
Storms, Legislative & Policy Coordination, Mitigation, Nuclear Power Plants, 
Preparedness, Public Assistance, Recovery, Response, Severe Winter Weather, 
Terrorism, Training, Transportation  
 
South Dakota:   
Office of Emergency Management (OEM) 
http://dps.sd.gov/emergency_services/emergency_management/default.aspx. 
Parent Organization is Public Safety 
Services: 911, Citizen Corps, Grants, Hazardous Materials, Homeland Security, 
Planning, Public Assistance, Training & Exercises 
 
Tennessee:   
Emergency Management Agency (TNEMA) 
http://www.tnema.org/. 
Parent Organization is Military Department 
Services: Communications Energy Failure, Failure, Family Preparedness, Fire, Geologic 
Hazard, Hazardous Materials, Response, Terrorism & Crime, Training & Exercises, 
Transportation, Energy Failure 
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Texas:   
Division of Emergency Management (TDEM) 
http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/dem/. 
Parent Organization is Public Safety 
Services: 211, Councils & Committees, Grants, Hurricane Planning, Mitigation, Planning, 
Recovery, Training & Exercise, Wildfires 
 
Utah:   
Division of Emergency Management (TDEM) 
http://publicsafety.utah.gov/emergencymanagement/. 
Parent Organization is Public Safety 
Services: CSEPP, Earthquake Preparedness, Flood Safety, Grants, Hazmat, Homeland 
Security Taskforce, Lightning Safety, Natural Hazards, NFIP, Power Outages, SAR, 
Surplus Property, Training & Exercises, VOAD, Winter Weather Preparedness  
 
Vermont:   
Vermont Emergency Management (VEM) 
http://vem.vermont.gov/. 
Parent Organization is Public Safety 
Services: Amateur Radio Civil Services, CERT, Community Preparedness, Emergency 
Alert System, Grants, Mitigation, Planning Committees, Radiological Preparedness, 
Training & Exercises  
 
Virginia:   
Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) 
http://www.vaemergency.com/. 
Parent Organization is Public Safety 
Services: CERT, Citizen Corps, Contracts & Procurement, Disaster Recovery, Fire 
Corps, Grants, Medical Reserve Corps, Neighborhood Watch, Planning, Preventing 
Repetitive Loss, Rebuilding, Recovery, Training, VIPS 
 
Washington:   
Emergency Management Division (EMD) 
http://www.riema.ri.gov/. 
Parent Organization is Military Department 
Services: E911, 6 Language Translations, Business Portal, Government Preparedness, 
Grants, Human Services, Kids Preparedness, Logistics & Resources, Natural Hazards, 
Neighborhood Preparedness, Radio Systems, SAR, Technological Hazards, Warning 
Systems, Training & Exercises  
 
West Virginia:   
Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (WVDHSEM) 
http://www.wvdhsem.gov/index.html.  
Parent Organization is Office of the Governor 
Services: Citizen Corps Council, Emergency Operations Plan, Flood Insurance, Flood 
Observing & Warning System, Floodplain Recovery, Hazard Mitigation, LEPC, 
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Wisconsin:   
Division of Emergency Management (WEM) 
http://emergencymanagement.wi.gov/. 
Parent Organization is Military Department 
Services: Emergency Alert System, EPCRA, NFIP, Hazard Mitigation, Hazardous 
Materials, Mitigation Success Stories, Planning, Radiological Preparedness, Recovery, 
Training & Exercises 
 
Wyoming:   
Office of Homeland Security (WOHS) 
http://wyohomelandsecurity.state.wy.us/main.aspx. 
Parent Organization is Office of the Governor 
Services: Communications Resources, Grants, IED Program, Infrastructure, K9 
Program, Preparedness Resources, State Emergency Response Commission 
 
(Note: PIO functions, WebEOC logins, Organization Human 
Resource/Financial/Administrative functions were not catalogued because these are 
presumed to be internal functions or directed to other emergency management 
organizations. Directories of staff and lists of local emergency contacts were not noted. 
Tier II functions were not noted as this function was not clear.) 
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